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PATENTING INDUSTRY STANDARDS
JANICE M. MUELLER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Air pollution caused by automobile tailpipe emissions plagues
virtually every country in the world;' in the United States,
perhaps no state suffers more than California.2 In December 1990,
the Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) filed a U.S. patent
application directed to "clean fuels"-automotive gasoline
compositions formulated to reduce tailpipe emissions.3 While
Unocal's patent application was pending in secrecy in the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 4 the California Air
* Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois.
The author welcomes comments and can be contacted via e-mail at
7mueller@jmls.edu. The author thanks Edward Rice for critiquing a draft of
this article, and Erik Stanek and Ben Kota for their valuable research
assistance.
1. Cf. Keith Bradsher and Andrew C. Revkin, A Pre-emptive Strike On
Global Warming, THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 15, 2001, at C12 (reporting that

the burning of one gallon of gasoline produces twenty pounds of global
warming gases, and that global-warming emissions from transportation
(generated primarily through the burning of gasoline and diesel fuel in
automobiles and trucks) increased by 3.4% in 1999).
2. See Bruce Newman, Clearing the Air In the Land of Smog, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, May 19, 1999, at A20 (reporting that although environmental
initiatives have reduced the state's air pollution to one-third of levels in the
1950s, California still has the dirtiest air in the U.S.). See also U.S. Patent

No. 5,288,393 (issued Feb. 22, 1994), at col. 1, lns. 9-16 asserting that:
[olne of the major environmental problems confronting the United
States and other countries is atmospheric pollution (i.e., "smog") caused
by the emission of gaseous pollutants in the exhaust gases from
automobiles. This problem is especially acute in major metropolitan
areas, such as Los Angeles, Calif., where the atmospheric conditions and
the great number of automobiles account for aggravated air pollution.
Id.
3. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Union Oil Co. of Cal.
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
1167 (2001) (No. 00-249). The Unocal application was filed with 82 claims on
December 13, 1990, asserting an invention date of March 1990. Id. Each of
the claims recited a gasoline composition characterized by a combination of
four to six properties: Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP), T10, T50, T90, Olefins,
Paraffins, Aromatics, and Octane. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 208 F.3d at 992.
4. Although under current law most pending U.S. patent applications will
be published eighteen months after their earliest effective filing date, 35

U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2001), the law in effect at the time of Unocal's application
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Resources Board (CARB) in November 1991 issued new
regulations for "clean-burning" gasoline; 5 the regulations would go
into effect in 19966 and be mandatory for all California gasoline
producers.7
The CARB developed the regulations through
consultation and technology-sharing with numerous interested
parties, including Unocal and other refiners! Meanwhile, Unocal's
application issued as U.S. Patent No. 5,288,393 in February of
1994. 9 Notably, its claims literally "read on" the CARB standards,
such that any unlicensed refiner selling gasoline in compliance
with the state-mandated standards would likely infringe Unocal's
'393 patent.
When Unocal later announced that it would initiate a
licensing program seeking royalties for the practice of its '393
patent, Atlantic Richfield, Chevron, Exxon, and a number of other
major oil refiners ("the refiners") sued for a declaratory judgment."0
The refiners unsuccessfully attacked the patent's validity on the
ground that Unocal's 1990 application did not sufficiently describe
the gasoline compositions on which the patent was issued in
1994.11 After a forty-nine day trial, a jury sustained the patent's
validity.1 2 A split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
required that all pending patent applications be maintained in secrecy until
issuance. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1990).
5. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, §§ 2250 et seq. (2000).
6. Id. at § 2261.
7. Id.

8. See Alexei Barrionuevo, ExhaustingFeud:A Patent FracasPits Unocal
Corp. Against Big U.S. Oil Producers,WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2000, at Al (citing
statement of Jananne Sharpless, the then chair of the CARB, that Unocal
argued for various concessions, as other oil companies did, in more than two
dozen meetings with California regulators to develop the CARB clean fuel
regulations, but did not disclose existence of its patent application). See
generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Unocal, 208 F.3d
at 989.
9. U.S. Patent No. 5,288,393 (issued Feb. 22, 1994). As issued the '393
patent contained 155 claims, but Unocal later disclaimed all but forty-one of
these claims. Unocal, 208 F.3d at 991.
10. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1222,
1224 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (describing procedural history).
11. More specifically, the declaratory plaintiff refiners charged that the '393
patent was invalid for failure to comply with the "written description of the
invention" requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, $11. This requirement insures that
the patentee "convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as
of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention." VasCath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis in
original).
12. Unocal, 208 F.3d at 994. The jury returned a special verdict form
indicating that each of the 41 asserted claims had not been proven invalid for
failure to comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
T 1. Id. The forty-one asserted claims were not originally-filed claims, but
they were added by amendment during prosecution of the '393 patent. Id. at
991.
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Federal Circuit affirmed.' 3
The refiners petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari,
arguing primarily that Unocal had improperly participated in the
CARB standards-setting process without ever revealing to the
CARB, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or anyone
else that it had a pending patent application on the product
After the CARB issued its
required by these standards.14
regulations, the refiners contended, Unocal cancelled its original
patent claims and intentionally substituted amended claims to
"resemble" the CARB regulations. 5 By manipulating U.S. patent
law's "written description requirement," 6 the refiners urged,
Unocal engaged in "gaming" of the regulatory and patent
processes, thereby placing the refiners in "a regulatory/patent law
vise." 7
Public criticism of Unocal was severe, particularly when it
became known that Unocal was seeking royalties under the '393
patent of approximately 5.75 cents per gallon of gasoline sold, 90%
of which were likely to be passed on to consumers.18 California's
Attorney General Bill Lockyer joined the fray, accusing Unocal of
seeking to "hijack and distort" the state regulatory process

13. Id. at 1002.
14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Union
Oil Co. of Cal., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1167
(2001) (No. 00-249).
15. Id.
16. Section 112, 1 of Title 35, U.S.C., requires that a U.S. patent provide:
a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same ....
Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561-62. This statutory provision is thought to
encompass two separate requirements: the "written description" requirement
Id. Compliance with the written
and the "enablement" requirement.
description requirement is discussed in further detail at Part III.A infra.
17. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Union Oil
Co. of California, 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1167
(2001) (No. 00-249).
18. See id. at 9. Based on that royalty, applied to the five-month time
period in 1996 at issue, the trial court awarded Unocal over sixty-nine million
dollars, plus interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. See Amici Curiae Brief of the
States of Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin and the District of Columbia In
Support of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari (hereafter Amici Curiae Brief of
the States) at 2, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 208 F.3d 989
(Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1167 (2001) (No. 00-249); Barrionuevo,
supra note 8, at Al.
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through its acquisition and enforcement of the '393 patent.1 9
Subsequently, Lockyer and 33 other state attorneys general filed
an amicus curiae brief in support of the refiners' certiorari
petition." The amici charged that Unocal "work[ed] hand-in-glove
with the other participants in a state administrative process to
develop cleaner-burning gasoline, while at the same time seeking
to garner a monopoly from the fruits of that joint endeavor, all the
while hiding its true objective."2'
Despite the outcry over the Unocal case, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari." As this article goes to print, the dispute is not
yet resolved; the Federal Trade Commission is considering a
request by Exxon Corporation to investigate Unocal's patenting
practices23 and a request for reexamination of Unocal's '393 patent
is pending in the USPTO.24
The Unocal gasoline patent story is but one of a growing
number of examples that illustrate the "capture" 5 of an industry
standard by a firm holding intellectual property rights in the
technical subject matter of that standard; i.e., the assertion of
intellectual property rights by a firm that both participated in the
standard-setting activity and also obtained proprietary rights in
some aspect of the technical subject matter of the standard. Other26
commentators have termed this a problem of standards "abuse"

19. See Julie Tamaki, Unocal Patent on Clean Fuel Stirs Outrage, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at A3; Press Release, Attorney General of California,
Attorney General Bill Lockyer Files "Friend of the Court" Brief Over Unocal
Gasoline Patent, http://caag.state.ca.us/press/2000idx.htm (Sept. 14, 2000)
(reporting that amicus curiae brief was filed on September 14, 2000 in the U.S.
Supreme Court on behalf of California and thirty-three other states, arguing

that Unocal "should not be able to 'hijack and distort' the state regulatory
process by claiming a patent on gasoline formulas developed in cooperation

with the government to meet clean air standards").
20. Amici CuriaeBrief of the States, supra note 18.

21. Id. at 12.
22. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 121 S. Ct. 1167, 1167
(2001) (No. 00-249).
23. See Exxon Mobil Seeks Probe of Unocal Patents, L.A. TIMES, May 8,
2001, at 4 (reporting that "Unocal has received $92 million for infringements

over a five-month period in California from six major oil companies, including
Exxon Mobil").
24. Reexamination Serial Number 90/005,942, filed Mar. 1, 2001. UNITED
STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, OFFICIAL GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 2001)

("Requests for Reexamination Filed" listing, including '393 patent), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2001/weekl3/patrequ.htm.
25. Commentators have previously used the term "capture" to characterize
anticompetitive behavior by certain intellectual property owners involved in
standards-setting.
See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet
StandardizationProblem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1086 (1996).

26. See In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 1996 FTC LEXIS 291,
*23 (1996) (Commr. Azcuenaga, dissenting) (describing the case as concerning

"alleged abuse of the standards-setting process by a patent holder").
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or "hidden intellectual property rights."27
Although previous standards disputes have implicated
copyright law,28 this Article focuses on standards capture through
patent procurement. Conflicts arise when a patent license is
essential to practicing a standard and the patent owner demands
royalties that standards users view as commercially unreasonable,
or refuses to license on any terms to certain users. 29 As patent
protection eclipses copyright and other forms of intellectual
property as the protection mechanism of choice for many
technologies, ° these disputes at the interface between patents and
industry standards will arise with increasing frequency.3
As
27. Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or
Collusion
(Rev.
June
8,
2000),
http://haas.berkeley.edu/-shapiro/standards.pdf, at 17.
28. See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516,
520-21 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding copyright misuse where the defendant
American Medical Association (AMA) granted a copyright license to a U.S.
federal government agency permitting use of AMA's copyrighted medical
procedure code by physicians filling out Medicaid and Medicare claim forms,
on the condition that the agency would not use any other system of medical
nomenclature); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 821-22 (1st
Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring) (noting that Lotus 1-2-3 has become a de
facto standard for electronic spreadsheet programs, and suggesting that
Borland's unlicensed use of Lotus's menu command structure may be
privileged).
29. See Jaap H. Spoor, Standardization and Exclusivity in Intellectual
Property, in INFORMATION LAW TOWARD THE 21ST CFENTURY (Kluwer 1992), at

374 (contending that patents on standards technology are not necessarily
problematic, unless "the patent owner refuses to grant any licenses, or grants
partial licenses only, in order to reserve a monopoly for himself').
30. For example, patenting of software-implemented business methods has
virtually exploded in the U.S. in the wake of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1093 (1999). See Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible
Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights For Business Concepts and Patent
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 590-91 (1999) (arguing that
sharp increase in patent applications stemming from this newly patentable
subject matter has pushed the patent system into crisis). See also Anne H.
Chasser, Developments At The United States Patent and Trademark Office, 19
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 27, 31 (2000) (stating that the USPTO has
"tripled the number of examiners that examine [patent applications directed
to] business methods" since State Street was decided).
31. For example, Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian describe the standardssetting process for the 28.8K modem standard as one in which "[m]ultiple
patent holders jockeyed to get their patents built into the standard to ensure
royalty income and to gain time-to-market advantage." CARL SHAPIRO AND
HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES (1999), at 239. See also Timothy
Baumann, As Standards Proliferate, So Too a Rise in Defendants Asserting
'Standards Abuse', 2 PATENT STRATEGY & MANAGEMENT 1 (June 2001)
(asserting that "[als standards have proliferated, so have patents covering all
or portions of standards," and that as a result, "defendants in infringement
suits have increasingly asserted defenses based on the 'standards abuse' of
patent holders").
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recently stated by the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,
"[s]tandard setting, often under the auspices of a trade association,
can facilitate innovation. On the other hand, private standard
setting, precisely because it is private, is subject to abuse.""
I survey the rise of industry standards-setting in Part II. In
Part III, I describe how instability in a number of patent law
doctrinal areas facilitates standards capture through patenting.
Contrary to the position taken by adherents of the "open
standards" movement, I contend in Part IV that the assertion of
patent rights over the subject matter of industry standards is not
inherently improper. I would impose on patent owners, however, a
mandatory obligation to disclose during their participation in the
standards-setting process the existence of any patents or pending
patent applications that are material to the standard. This
obligation, which parallels that borne by all U.S. patent applicants
to disclose known information material to patentability to the
USPTO during patent procurement, is detailed in Part V.
If compliance with the standard ultimately adopted requires
the practice of a patent that was not disclosed, the patent owner
who participated in setting the standard but failed to disclose the
patent's existence should be subject to compulsory licensing; i.e.,
the patentee should have to license the patent to any user of the
standard at commercially reasonable terms, and may not refuse to
license.
What is "reasonable" should be determined by a
competent authority or industry experts, not left to the patent
owner to determine ex post. In egregious cases, where the nondisclosure of a relevant patent was willful or intentional, courts
should refuse to enforce the patent altogether under the patent
misuse doctrine, as described in Part V.
II.

THE RISE OF INDUSTRY STANDARDS-SETTING

Before addressing several specific intersections between
patent law doctrine and industry standards, I review in this Part
the growth of industry standards, the various types of standards
now in place, and the intellectual property policies that have been
adopted by many standards-setting organizations.
A.

The Industries Impacted by Standards-Setting

Industry standards are pervasive. For example, one or more
hardware or software standards governs virtually every aspect of
using a computer or connecting to the Internet.33

32. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues
at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 550 (2001).
33. Larry Seltzer, The Standards Industry: Corporate Consortia Are
Supplanting Traditional Rule-Making Bodies, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 15,
2001, at 50. A recent "essay"-type advertisement for Microsoft asserts that
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Standards development is particularly critical for the digital
The U.S. Government predicts that standards are
economy.'
needed in at least the following areas: electronic payments;
security (confidentiality, authentication, data integrity, access
control, non-repudiation); security services infrastructure (e.g.,
electronic
copyright
key
certificate
authorities);
public
management systems; video and data-conferencing; high-speed
network technologies (e.g., Asynchronous Transfer Mode,
Synchronous Digital Hierarchy); and digital object and data
interchange.35
Beyond computing, standards exist in all industries, including
safety and health, telecommunications, information processing,
The standards
petroleum, medical devices, and the like.36
mandated by the State of California's Air Resources Board in
Even biotechnology is
Unocal cover gasoline formulations.
Arguably, the human
undergoing standards development.37
genome has become a de facto standard. Myriad firms need access
to the genome's structure and sequence"' in order to develop new
drugs, therapies, and diagnostic tools based on that information.
Conflicts no doubt will arise as researchers seek licenses under the
relevant genome patents.39 Standards convergence is also likely
for the software platforms used to sequence, manipulate, and view

"almost everything on the Internet, from the protocols that move data around
the network to the software behind the World Wide Web, is built on open,
consensus-based standards." Microsoft Corporation, Open Minded, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Apr. 11, 2001, at A12.
34. See, e.g., The White House, A Framework for Global Economic
Commerce, N. Y. TIMES, April 11, 2001, (National Report), at A12, availableat
(hereinafter
"Framework")
http://www.ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm
(asserting that "[sitandards are critical to the long term commercial success of
the Internet as they can allow products and services from different vendors to
work together").
35. Id.
36. American National Standards Institute, Guidelines for Implementation
of the ANSI Patent Policy: An Aid to More Efficient and Effective Standards
Development In Fields That May Involve Patented Technology, at
http://web.ansi.org/public/library/guides/ppguide.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2001).
37. For example, "[b]ioinformatics.org is a non-profit, academe-based
organization committed to opening access to bioinformatics research projects,
providing Open Source software for bioinformatics by hosting its development,
Bioinformatics.org,
and keeping biological information freely available."
bioinformatics.org:The Open Lab, at http://bioinformatics.org/about.php (last
visited Apr. 6, 2001).
38. See J.C. Venter, The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 SCIENCE 1304
(2001), available at http://publication.celera.com.
39. For further discussion of the problem of patents on research tools, see
generally Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research
Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001).
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genetic data.4 °
Three primary factors are driving the rise of standardssetting: product interoperability, 41 public health and safety, 42 and
global
competitiveness.43
Most
compelling
is product
interoperability. 4' As increasing numbers of consumers acquire
notebook computers, personal
digital assistants, cellular
telephones, pagers, and other productivity and communication
tools, the need for these devices to communicate with one another,
as well as consumer desire for new application programs that will
operate on all of these devices, is self-evident. Anyone who has
experienced the frustrations of converting documents created in
one word processing software program to another, switching
between the leading computerized legal research providers to find
desired content, or using a computer keyboard manufactured in a
foreign country will immediately grasp the practical importance of
standardization.
B. De Facto vs. De Jure Standards
Analysis of technology standards should distinguish between

40. Professor Arti Rai suggests that network externality issues may arise
where a specific platform for viewing and manipulating computerized genetic
and protein sequences becomes an industry de facto standard. Arti K. Rai,
Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the BiopharmaceuticalIndustry: The Role
of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 821 n.33 (2001).
Bioinformatics firms that obtained proprietary rights (such as copyright) in
the software could obtain market power as a result of network externalities.
Id.
41. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has noted "the
important role of standard-setting in the technological innovation that will
drive much of this nation's competitive vigor in the 21st Century." In re Dell
Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 1996 FTC LEXIS 291, *20 (1996).
42. A terrible fire that in 1904 destroyed over 1,500 buildings in Baltimore,
Maryland, aptly illustrates that public safety concerns often drive
standardization. Although fire departments from other cities were called in to
assist, they were powerless to fight the flames because the fire hose-connectors
of Baltimore's hydrants were incompatible with those of the other cities.
Malcolm W. Browne, Refining the Art of Measurement, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2001, at D1-D6.
43. Disparities in standards and conformity assessment practices between
the U.S. and its trading partners may cause technical barriers to international
trade. Global Standards and Information Program, U.S. Department of
Commerce
Standards
Expert,
at
http://ts.nist.gov/ts/htdocs/210/216/sitdescr.htm (visited Mar. 31, 2001).
"Standards also can be employed as de facto non-tariff trade barriers, to 'lock
out' non-indigenous businesses from a particular national market."
Framework, supra note 34, at Section 9 ("Technical Standards").
44. See Lemley, supra note 25, at 1047 (discussing need for "vertical
compatibility" in a variety of industries). A common example is the need for
compatibility between electric power plugs on appliances and the electrical
outlets in the walls of homes and businesses. See id. (noting that a plug is
"useless" unless it can connect to a wall outlet).
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de jure standards and de facto standards.45 De facto standards are
not promulgated by a particular body, but rather arise
spontaneously due to marketplace success. Classic examples of de
facto standards include the QWERTY typewriter keyboard layout46
and the Microsoft Windows operating system for personal
computers.
De facto standards commonly exist in markets characterized
by network externalities (or "network effects")." In such markets
the value that consumers place on a good increases as more and
more consumers use that good.4" A fax machine is a classic
example of a positive network externality - as more people own
fax machines, the value of any one person's fax machine to that
person increases.49 As applied to standards, network externality
theory predicts that the more widely a given technology standard
is adopted, the more valuable it becomes. Network effects markets
will be attractive targets for firms who can position their own
0
proprietary technology as the technical standard in that market."
The focus of this article is primarily de jure standards, which
are rules for implementing a technology that are set by some
official body, be it a government, industry, or academic
consortium. The well-known ASCII (American National Standard
Code for Information Interchange) standard, used in software, is a
de jure standard promulgated by the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI).51 De jure standards are further

45. Seltzer, supra note 33, at 50-51.

46. Marketplace success does not always equate with technological
superiority. The QWERTY typewriter keyboard layout was developed in the
1870s by the creators of the Type Writer brand as a means to slow down

typists and thereby prevent certain frequently-used typewriter keys from
excessive jamming. SHAPIRO AND VARIAN, supra note 31, at 185. Although
the

competing

Dvorak

layout

(patented

in

1932)

was

considered

technologically superior, the QWERTY format won out because the "collective
switching costs" of migration to Dvorak for users already comfortable with

QWERTY was simply too high. Id.
47. "Externalities arise when one market participant affects others without
compensation being paid." SHAPIRO AND VARIAN, supra note 31, at 183.
48. Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 481 (1998).
49. SHAPIRO AND VARIAN, supra note 31, at 183. Examples of negative
network externalities include pollution: one person's sewage ruins the
drinking or swimming water of many other individuals. Id.
50. See Pitofsky, supra note 32, at 538-39 (noting that "products and
services based on intellectual property frequently exhibit 'network effects,"'
and asserting that "[the exclusionary rights granted by intellectual property

protection, coupled with trends toward standardization due to network effects,
threaten to diminish market competition"). See also Lemley and McGowan,

supra note 48, at 481.
51. Seltzer, supra note 33, at 50-51.

ANSI is a private, non-profit
organization that "administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary
standardization and conformity assessment system." American National
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divisible between (i) mandatory de jure standards such as the
gasoline emissions standards set by a government agency, the
CARB in the Unocal case discussed supra, and (ii) consensual de
jure standards such as the World Wide Web language Hyper Text
Markup Language (HTML)," which was developed by the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C).53 Consensual de jure standards are
consensual in the sense that no firm is legally bound to follow
them. However, marketplace reality suggests that most firms will
comply with the standard rather than develop their own
alternative technology.
C. Intellectual PropertyPolicies

Many standards-setting bodies have implemented intellectual
property policies.
These policies illustrate a spectrum of
obligations for holders of patent and other intellectual property
rights in the subject matter of the standard.
The most
burdensome policies, from a patent owner's perspective, require
that the owner of any patent deemed essential to practicing the
standard grant a royalty-free license to any user of the standard. 4
Other standards-setting bodies require that patent owners grant
licenses under terms that are "reasonable and nondiscriminatory."" Still other bodies do not oblige patent owners to
Standards Institute, About ANSI, at http://www.ansi.org/public/about.html
(last visited May 26, 2001).
52. Jocelyn Kaiser, Internet Patents Choking the Web?, 284 SCIENCE 1427
(1999).
53. The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is an international industry
and academic consortium of over 350 members dedicated to "lead[ing] the Web
to its full potential by developing common protocols that promote its evolution
and ensure its interoperability." World Wide Web Consortium, About the
World
Wide
Web
Consortium
[W3C],
at
http://www.w3.org/1999/10/28-P3P-IntermindPatentAnalysis-PressRelease.
html (last visited July 21, 2001), at 2-3. Membership in the W3C is by
corporation and is not open to all, unlike other standards consortia such as the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). See Seltzer, supra note 34, at 52.
54. For example, the Joint Electronic Devices Engineering Council
(JEDEC) requires that patents incorporated into its standards be licensed
either royalty-free or under "reasonable" terms and conditions that are
"demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination."
Electronic Industries
Alliance, JEDEC Manual of Organizationand ProcedureJM21-K Annex F 42,
availableat http://www.jedic.org/Home/manuals/jm2lk.pdf (Feb. 2, 1999).
55. For example, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) requires that
owners of IPRs in adopted standards agree to license them at openly-specified,
reasonable, non-discriminatory terms. See Internet Engineering Task Force,
The Internet Standards Process para. 10.3.2(C) (1996) available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2026.txt, providing that:
[w]here the IESG knows of rights, or claimed rights under (A), the IETF
Executive Director shall attempt to obtain from the claimant of such
rights, a written assurance that upon approval by the IESG of the
relevant Internet standards track specification(s), any party will be able
to obtain the right to implement, use and distribute the technology or
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license, requiring only that participants make a disclosure of any
patents or pending patent applications that are related to the
subject matter of the standard. 6 Lastly, some standards-setting
bodies do not appear to have any formal intellectual property
policies whatsoever, as in the case of the CARB in Unocal.7
III.

PATENT LAW AND THE FACILITATION OF STANDARDS CAPTURE

A number of substantive patent law doctrines operate at the
intersection of industry standards and proprietary rights.
Doctrinal instability in several areas of patent law helps explain
how patents are being obtained in the technology of industry

works when implementing, using or distributing technology based upon
the specific specification(s) under openly specified, reasonable, nondiscriminatory terms.
Id. For a list of statements by corporate IETF members on their respective
IPRs, see Internet Engineering Task Force, IETF Page of Intellectual Property
Rights Notices, available at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.html (last visited Apr. 7,
2001).
The IETF is "a large open international community of network
designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of
the Internet architecture and the smooth operation of the Internet. It is open
to any interested individual." Internet Engineering Task Force, Overview of
the IETF, available at http://www.ietf.org/overview.html (last visited Apr. 7,
2001). The IETF has been described as "the single most important Internet
standards body." Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory
Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 760 n.2
(1999).
Similarly, the patent policy of the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) provides that ANSI does not object in principle to proposed American
National Standards that include the use of a patented item, if such use is
technologically justified. However, the identified patent holder must supply
ANSI with a written assurance that it will license applicants who desire to
implement the standard either without compensation or "under reasonable
terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination."
American National Standards Institute, Guidelines for Implementation of the
ANSI Patent Policy, at http://web.ansi.org/public/library/guides/ppguide.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2001).
56. For example, the Joint Electronic Devices Engineering Council
(JEDEC) has a policy requiring all participants in standards-setting
discussions to disclose any IP they hold that might be involved in the standard
at issue. See Electronic Industries Alliance, JEDEC Manual of Organization
and
Procedure
JM21-K
Annex
F
42,
at
http://www.jedec.org/Home/manuals/jm21k.pdf (Feb. 2, 1999) (providing that
standards that require use of patented technology "may not be considered by a
JEDEC committee unless all of the relevant technical information covered by
the patent or pending patent is known"). However, JEDEC does require that
any such patent be licensed either royalty-free or under "reasonable" terms
and conditions that are "demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination." Id.
57. Cf. Tamaki, supra note 19, at A3 (reporting that Unocal officials
"contend they have done nothing wrong. No law or agreement required them
to disclose their patent application..."); Barrionuevo, supra note 8, at Al
(reporting position of Unocal officials that "[n]o law required Unocal to reveal
its patent ambitions").

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:897

standards, subject matter that many consider to be the product of
communal development and by definition not subject to exclusive
rights.
A. Shifting Interpretationsof the "Written Descriptionof the
Invention" Requirement
The declaratory plaintiff refiners in Unocal' challenged the
validity of Unocal's '393 patent under the statutory requirement
that a U.S. patent must contain a "written description of the
invention. ' 9 The refiners specifically criticized Unocal's conceded
amendment of its pending patent claims to "resemble" the CARB
regulations. 0
Issues of compliance with the written description requirement
frequently arise when, as in Unocal, new patent claims are added
to a pending patent application,6 1 or when existing claims are
substantively amended. U.S. patent law allows applicants to add
and amend claims during the patent procurement process, so long
as the originally-filed application "supports" the new claim
language, and the amendments introduce no "new matter"6 3 into
the application. 4
58. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir.
2000), detailed in Part I, infra.
59. Id. at 994; 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001) requiring that patent include:
[A] written description of the invention, and of the manner and process
of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same ....

Id.
60. See Barrionuevo, supra note 8, at Al (reporting that Unocal inventor
Dr. Peter Jessup admitted in his 1997 federal court testimony that "some of
the company's patent claims 'were narrowed' to 'resemble the regulations").
61. See Unocal, 208 F.3d at 1002 (Lourie, J., dissenting-in-part) (stating
that "[n]one of [the claims at issue] were in the original application; all were
added by amendment"). See generally In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (C.C.P.A.
1973), explaining that:
[s]atisfaction of the description requirement insures that subject matter
presented in the form of a claim subsequent to the filing date of the
application was sufficiently disclosed at the time of filing so that the
prima facie date of invention [of that newly-claimed subject matter] can
fairly be held to be the filing date of the application.

Id.
62. See, e.g., In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1382-85 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(addressing whether the written description and original claims adequately
supported limitation added by preliminary amendment).
63. "New matter" is a patent law term of art. Professor Chisum explains
that "[niew matter includes any alteration or addition to the matter originally
disclosed. It does not include amendments that merely clarify or make
definite matter originally disclosed."
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS 1-G1 (2001) ("Glossary" entry for "new matter").
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2001) (providing that claims may be amended
and specifying that "[n]o amendment shall introduce new matter into the
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When patents issue with new or amended claims that are not
adequately supported by the originally-filed written description,
the patent applicant is not entitled to those claims," and they may
be held invalid in subsequent litigation.66 Imposition of the
written description requirement in this manner guards against
"over-reaching" by inventors.67 The requirement operates as a
timing mechanism to ensure fair play in the presentation of claims
after the original filing date and to guard against manipulation of
that process by the patent applicant. Absent written description
scrutiny, a later-presented claim not truly entitled to the earlier
filing date of the application would be improperly examined
against a smaller universe of prior art than is legally available.6
The written description requirement takes a "snapshot" view of
the inventor's contribution as of the filing date of the application,
and asks whether that "snapshot" reasonably conveys to persons of
ordinary skill that any subsequently-claimed subject matter was
truly and fairly part of that contribution. 69 If not, those claims
may be rejected by the PTO examiner, or even if allowed,
adjudicated invalid in subsequent litigation.
The Federal Circuit panel majority in Unocal concluded that
Unocal's '393 patent complied with the written description
requirement.6 In the view of the majority, persons of ordinary
skill in the art, having read the originally-filed 1990 application,
would have understood from that disclosure how to make the
later-claimed gasoline formulations." The majority upheld the
validity of the disputed claims despite the fact that the supporting
disclosures, which corresponded to the various chemical property
limitations of the asserted claims, were scattered throughout
different portions of the patent application and not collected in any

disclosure of the invention").
65. See, e.g., In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).

66. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (invalidating patent claims for failure to comply with written
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, T 1).
67. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)

(quoting Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981)
(identifying written description policy concern of "guardling] against the

inventor's overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in such
detail that his future claims can be determined to be encompassed within his
original creation").
68. Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description
Requirement to BiotechnologicalInventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 622
(1998).

69. Id. at 621.
70. Union Oil Co. of Cali. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 1001 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
71. Id. at 999 (concluding that "the record shows that the inventors
possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing in the assessment of those

of ordinary skill in the petroleum refining art").
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one discrete description of a claimed composition."
The highly deferential "substantial evidence" standard of
review applied by the Unocal majority to the jury's verdict of
written description compliance, a question of fact, no doubt
influenced the result.7" More broadly, the Unocal majority's
affirmance may signal a retreat from the ultra-rigorous
application of written description rules illustrated by other recent
Federal Circuit pronouncements on the subject. 74 The Unocal
decision reflects a much more liberal perspective of the evidentiary
requirements necessary to establish an inventor's "possession" of a
claimed invention than the Federal Circuit's controversial 1997
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly, 5
authored by the dissenting judge on the Unocal panel." The
disputed claims in Lilly, directed to insulin-encoding cDNA for
humans and other higher mammals, were invalidated based on
the application's failure to provide the precise nucleotide sequence
corresponding to this cDNA.7 7 The Federal Circuit held the claims
invalid despite the fact that the patentee had provided the
nucleotide sequence for insulin-encoding rat cDNA, as well as
disclosed a method by which the human sequence could be derived
therefrom. The accused infringer never challenged the patent's
validity on enablement grounds. 8
The Unocal majority's reliance on what persons of ordinary
72. See id. at 998 (table showing support for claim limitations of claim 117);
id. at 1002 (Lourie, J., dissenting-in-part) (noting "references to different parts
of the specification for the various components" and concluding that "[t]he
patent does not contain such complete descriptions of those compositions").
73. See id. at 999 (noting that the Unocal jury "reached the same conclusion
[of written description compliance] as a matter of fact - a proposition that this
court cannot disturb on this record which supplies substantial evidence to
support that finding").
74. See Lawrence M. Sung, On Treating Past as Prologue, 2001 U. ILL. J. L.
TECH. & POL'y 75, 92-93 (2001) (contending that in Unocal, Federal Circuit
shifts the focus of written description requirement away from patentee's
disclosure considered in isolation and towards the understanding of the
disclosure gleaned by those of ordinary skill in the art).
75. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the written description requirement was not
satisfied for university's patent claims to a DNA absent an express disclosure
in the specification of the nucleotide sequence for that DNA).
76. See Unocal, 208 F.3d at 1002 (Lourie, J., dissenting-in-part).
77. See Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567 (contrasting lack of human cDNA sequence
data with Regents' provision of rat cDNA sequence data in Example 5 of '525
patent).
78. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225,
1239-41 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (identifying written description requirement as the
only issue of invalidity raised with respect to Regents' '525 patent). See also
Federal Circuit Rules it Takes More Than One cDNA Sequence to Claim a
Genus, III INTELL. PROP. LAWCAST (Dec. 29, 1997) (audio interview of
Regents' counsel Harold J. McElhinny) (stating that Lilly never raised nonenablement as a defense to Regents' '525 patent).
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skill in the art would have understood from Unocal's 1990
disclosure, supplemented by their pre-existing knowledge of that
art, echoes the perspective taken in Vas-Cath v. Mahurkar." In
that
1991 decision
the Federal Circuit signaled
the
appropriateness of importing the knowledge of the art worker into
the written description analysis. 0 The Vas-Cath "skill in the art"
analysis was largely abandoned in an intervening line of stringent
inventor-possession-centric
written
description
decisions
82
exemplified by Lilly,"'
Lockwood
v.
American
Airlines,
and
Gentry
83
Gallery v. Berkline.
While the Unocal decision returns the Federal Circuit to a
more liberal construction of written description compliance, it also
facilitates standards capture by amendments during prosecution
that attempt to track a developing industry standard, like those
made by Unocal. Such amendments are not improper as a matter
of patent law, so long as adequate written description support was
present in the application as filed. Doctrinal play in the "adequate
support" requirement thus facilitates standards capture. After
Unocal, patentees have a decidedly stronger basis for argument
that sufficient support exists for their amendments made with a
view towards aligning patent claim coverage with industry
standards requirements.
Unocal amicus curiae California Attorney General Bill
Lockyer contends that when patent rights intersect with
government regulation as in the Unocal case, public policy
considerations warrant "strict construction" of the written
description requirement.'
The Federal Circuit chose not to
address those larger public policy questions when determining
written description compliance in Unocal, and with good reason.
Modifying the substantive requirements of patentability for
specific technologies or types of patent claims would inject an
unacceptable degree of uncertainty into an area of patent
jurisprudence already perceived as unstable. Other tools are more
79. 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
80. Id. at 1565-67 (finding that declaration testimony of Dr. Stephen Ash,
submitted by patentee as representative of understanding of person of
ordinary skill in the art, evidenced inventor's possession of claimed invention
as of application filing date).
81. See generally Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559.
82. 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir 1997), holding that:
[a] description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier
filing date is sought is not sufficient .... It is not sufficient for purposes

of the written description requirement of § 112 that the disclosure, when
combined with the knowledge in the art, would lead one to speculate as
to modifications that the inventor might have envisioned, but failed to
disclose.

Id.
83. See generally 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
84. See Amici Curiae Brief of the States, supra note 18, at 8-9.
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appropriate. 5
Rather than contracting written description
doctrine to deal with patents on government-regulated subject
matter, the better approach is to deal with such public policy
concerns through limitations on patent enforcement such as
compulsory licensing, and in extreme cases, non-enforcement
under a theory of patent misuse, as discussed below.86
B. Non-Availability of Industry Standards as PriorArt
Unlike the patent law of other nations, U.S. patent law is a
first-to-invent regime.' 7 In order to operate as prior art that can
potentially anticipate or render obvious the subject matter of a
U.S. patent claim, a qualifying disclosure must have an effective
date that is prior to the patent applicant's invention date.88 The
prior art disclosure need not have been publicly available. Ror
example, in OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.," the Federal
Circuit held that the secret disclosure of a design that "inspired"
the inventor was properly considered prior art under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(f)/103. 90
The patent owner in Unocal asserted an invention date of
March 1990. 9' Assuming that this assertion is correct, Unocal's
invention date was prior to Unocal's participation in the CARB
85. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13 n.4, Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1167 (2001) (No. 00-249) (agreeing with the Unocal court
that "Section 112 states important requirements that protect the public
against patent monopolies that are unjustified by the purposes of patent law,"
but disagreeing with Unocal's assertion that "Section 112 is particularly
directed toward 'gaming of the regulatory and patent regimes,' or that it is the
'only bulwark' against such conduct").
86. For a discussion of applicable remedies, see Part V infra.
87. See generally 3-10 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.01
(2001) (contrasting first-to-file systems with first-to-invent systems).
88. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (e), (g) (2001) (requiring that novelty-destroying
events occurred "before the invention" by the patent applicant); 35 U.S.C.
§103 (requiring that invention be non-obvious "at the time the invention was
made"). This before-the-invention-date rule for prior art does not apply in
countries other than the U.S., which have a first-to-file system that assesses
novelty as of the applicant's filing date and are not concerned with any earlier
invention date. See, e.g., European Patent Convention, Art. 54 (2001)
(providing that "[an invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form
part of the state of the art," and defining "state of the art" as "everything made
available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in
any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent application").
89. 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
90. Id. at 1401, 1403-04.
91. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Atlantic Richfield
Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 1167 (2001) (No. 00-249) (stating that Unocal's patent application was filed
on December 13, 1990, and asserted an invention date of March 1990). See
also Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1214
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (stating that Unocal's invention date was March 30, 1990).
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deliberations that led to the clean gasoline standards at issue in
that case." Thus, any disclosures subsequently made by Unocal or
the other refiners during those deliberations could not operate as
prior art to anticipate or render obvious the inventions claimed in
Unocal '393 patent. Whether Unocal's asserted invention date of
March 1990 was legally correct involved relatively complex issues
of conception and reduction to practice that the Federal Circuit did
not consider. These issues also arise in the context of determining
inventorship.
C. ImproperInventorship, Lack of Originality,and Derivation
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)
are
inventorship
Patents that incorrectly designate
potentially invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f). A patent will not be
granted to the named inventor if "he did not himself invent the
subject matter sought to be patented."93 However, liberalization of
the rules for naming inventors in the 1952 Patent Act allows the
For example, the
correction of inventorship in many cases."
Federal Circuit recently held in a case of first impression that a
putative inventor need not have any claim to an ownership
interest in a disputed patent in order to have standing to sue for
correction of its inventorship. 9'
92. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2 n.1, Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1167 (2001) (No. 00-249) (stating that at time of Unocal's
application filing date (Dec. 13, 1990), CARB had announced its intent to issue
clean gasoline regulations but the precise parameters of those regulations
were still unclear).
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2001) (providing that "[a] person shall be entitled
to a patent unless ... he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be
patented").
94. See 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2001) (providing that "error of omitting
inventors ... shall not invalidate the patent in which such error occurred if it
can be corrected as provided in this section"); Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d
1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (broadly interpreting § 256 as a "savings provision"
to prevent loss of patent rights merely because inventors were improperly
named). If the patent owner agrees to the correction of inventorship, this may
be done by application to the USPTO. MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co.,
870 F.2d 1568, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1989); 35 U.S.C. § 256, T 1. If the patent owner
does not agree, however, a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction
to correct inventorship so long as all parties have received adequate notice and
an opportunity to be heard. MCV, 870 F.2d at 1570; 35 U.S.C. § 256 T 2.
95. Chou v. Univ. of Chicago, 254 F.3d 1347, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15028
(Fed. Cir. July 3, 2001). The Chou court held that despite a former university
graduate student's obligation to assign all inventions to her university
employer such that she would not have an ownership interest in the disputed
patent, the student possessed standing to sue for correction of inventorship of
that patent under 35 U.S.C. § 256 because of her "concrete financial interest"
in potential royalty income and stock to which named inventors are entitled
under the university's patent policy. Id. at *21. In dicta, the Federal Circuit
suggested that even "reputational interest alone" (i.e., one's interest in being
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Determining whom should be named as the inventor of a
particular invention is a rather indeterminate task. The key
criterion is contribution to the conception of the invention.
Conception has been described as the "touchstone" of
inventorship." More particularly, conception involves the
formation in the mind of the inventor of the complete and
operative invention, as it is thereafter reduced to practice.97
A corollary to the proper naming of inventors is the patent
law concept of derivation.98 Section 102(f) of the Patent Act "bars
issuance of a valid patent to a person or persons who derive the
conception of the invention from any other source or person."99 In
other words, if a patent applicant claims an invention whose
conception was communicated to the applicant by a third party
who is not named as an inventor, any resulting patent on that
invention would be subject to invalidation under Section 102(f). 00
The Unocal trial court flatly rejected an assertion by the
refiners that Unocal had derived its inventions by "cop[ying] the
invention from CARB," 1 and this issue was not addressed by the
Federal Circuit on appeal. However, other standards-setting
scenarios are easily foreseeable that could invoke inventorship and
derivation disputes, particularly where a patent application is
filed during or after the standard-setting body's deliberations. At
a minimum, patent applicants engaged in standards-setting
activities must maintain thorough records that document their
claim of sole inventorship. Asserted invention dates that post-date
the applicant's participation in standards-setting deliberations
will be suspect.
D. Secret Pendency of U.S. PatentApplications

Standards-setting participants are significantly less likely to
conceal the existence of their pending patent applications after
passage of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) of

named as an inventor to enhance professional prestige) might be enough to
confer standing to sue for correction of inventorship. Id. at *20.
96. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
97. Id. at 1228.
98. See

DONALD

S.

CHISUM,

CHISUM

ON

PATENTS

(2001)

§

2.03

(characterizing rule of proper joinder of inventors as "corollary" to derivation
rule).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Campbell v. Spectrum Automation Co., 513 F.2d 932 (6h Cir.
1975).
101. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1224
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding that "[n]o competent evidence was introduced in
support of... [the derivation] argument and the jury did not find the patent
invalid on that basis").
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1999.12
As amended by the AIPA, the U.S. Patent Act now
requires publication of most pending U.S. patent applications"'
eighteen months after the earliest priority date claimed by the
applicant.'
Competitors possessing prior art that appears to
contravene an applicant's assertion of novelty and non-obviousness
may submit that art to the PTO while the application is still
pending.105
However, patent applicants who file only in the U.S. may opt
out of eighteen-month publication.' 6
Given the size and
dominance of the U.S. technology market, particularly in the
computer and software sector,' °7 it is not improbable that the
adoption of a U.S. industry standard which requires the use of an
applicant's invention might be far more valuable to some
applicants than the possibility of multi-national patent protection.
Applicants seeking U.S. patent protection for standards technology
could continue to conceal the existence of their pending
applications from fellow standards-setting participants by
foregoing international protection.
Because the new USPTO
publication rules will not guarantee that all pending patent
applications pertinent to the ongoing development of an industry
standards will be revealed in a timely fashion, other publicationforcing mechanisms are required. I propose infra the sanctions of
compulsory licensing and unenforceability for patent misuse.' 8
T

102. Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of
1999, Title IV (American Inventors Protection Act of 1999), Pub. L. No. 106113, §§ 4001-4808, 113 Stat. 1501A-521, 1501A-552-591 (1999).

103.T he USPTO estimates that approximately eighty (80) percent of all
applications will be published under the new law. Sabra Chartrand, Patents:
A New Law Removes Some Secrecy from the Applications, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at C6 (reporting that USPTO is "preparing to publish 80
percent of all applications").
104. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2001).

105. 37 CFR 1.99 (2001) providing in part that:
[a] submission by a member of the public of patents or publications
relevant to a pending published application may be entered in the
application file if the submission complies with the requirements of this
section and the application is still pending when the submission and
application file are brought before the examiner.
Id.
106. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2001).
107. See Office of Information Technologies, Size of the U.S. Computer
Software
Industry,
at

http://exportit.ita.doc.gov/ocbe/USIndust.nsf/806cbc35babba983852569510078
4a38/538b5d24b610208985256962006c9lc8!OpenDocument
(last updated
Sept. 22, 2000) (reporting that from 1992 to 1997, total employment in U.S.
computer software industry increased by 75% totaling 1,457,405, and that
estimated receipts rose from $95 billion to $231 billion). See generally J.
Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property-America's Overlooked Export, 20 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 809 (1995).
108. See Part V, infra.
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IV. PATENT RIGHTS ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH INDUSTRY
STANDARDS

Industry standards often encompass proprietary technology,
including technology that has been patented or is the subject of
pending patent applications.10 9 It is not surprising that many
standards are based on technology that qualifies for patent
protection, because one would expect an industry standard to be
built upon novel and nonobvious advances in technology rather
than simply whatever is available in the public domain.1 This
view is reflected by the position of leading trade associations that
"[sItandards in... high-tech industries must be based on the
leading-edge technologies. Consumers will not buy second-best
products that are based only on publicly available information. "..
Conversely, standards development is sometimes driven by
the desire to avoid proprietary technology. For example, in late
2000 the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a
non-regulatory federal agency within the U.S. Department of
Commerce,1 announced its selection of the new cryptographic
standard that would replace the prior Digital Encryption Standard
(DES)." 3 The new standard was based on the Rijmen algorithm,
named after the algorithm's designer.1
Notably, the Rijmen
algorithm was the only algorithm among the five finalists that
would not potentially infringe patents owned by Hitachi

109. See, e.g., American National Standards Institute, Guidelines for
Implementation
of
the
ANSI
Patent Policy,
available
at
http://web.ansi.org/public/library/guides/ppguide.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2001) (providing that ANSI has "no objection in principle to [the] drafting [of
a proposed American National Standard in terms that include the use of a
patented item, if it is considered that technical reasons justify this approach");
Electronic Industries Alliance, JEDEC Manual of Organizationand Procedure
JM21-K § 7.3, available at http://www.jedec.orgfHome/manuals/jm21k.pdf
(Feb. 2, 1999) (stating that there is "no restriction against drafting a proposed
standard in terms that include a patented item if technical reasons justify the
inclusion," but that such standards should be considered "with great care").
See also Spoor, supra note 29, at 374 (contending that "many standards are
partly or entirely covered by patents").
110. For example, the Joint Electronic Devices Engineering Council
(JEDEC) takes the position that "[ciommittee discussion of pending or existing
patents is ...encouraged when the committee feels that the patented item or
process represents the best technical basis for a standard." Electronic
Industries Alliance, JEDEC Manual of Organization and Procedure JM21-K
Annex G 43, at http://www.jedic.org/Home/manuals/jm21k.pdf (Feb. 2, 1999).
111. Letter
of
Dan
Bart,
Electronic
Industries
Association
(EIA)/Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) Vice President, to
Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 22, 1996) (on file with author), at 4.
112. National Institute of Standards and Technology, General Information,
at http://www.nist.gov/public-affairs/general2.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
113. Charles Seife & David Malakoff, Science Scope, 290 SCIENCE 25 (2000).
114. Id.
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Corporation. ' These patents, issued to Hitachi earlier in 2000,
1 16
claimed an array of mathematical techniques used by ciphers.
Like NIST, other standards-setting organizations have gone to
considerable lengths to establish that the technology they have
adopted does not infringe any existing patents.' 7
Proprietary rights such as patent ownership appear
inconsistent, at least facially, with the concept of "open"
Some standards proponents contend that consensusstandards.'
based industry standards are antithetical to proprietary rights by
individual firms, and would not permit any patenting of industry
Adherents of the "Open Source""' 9 and "Free
standards.
2
Software"" movements 12 support this view, pointing to classic,
successful open source efforts developed in the absence of
intellectual property rights, such as the computer operating
systems Linux, Perl, and Apache.' 22 Some legal scholars suggest

115. Id.
116. Id.

117. For example, in January 1999 the Seattle-based Internet company
Intermind Corporation obtained a patent directed to its software that assists
Web surfers in tracking how the sites they visit are using their personal data.
See U.S. Patent No. 5,862,325 (issued Jan. 19, 1999) (titled "Computer-Based
Communication System and Method Using Metadata Defining a Control
Structure"). Intermind claimed that its '325 patent was infringed by an "opensource," or freely shared, privacy protocol for exchanging data specified by the
W3C's Platform for Privacy Preferences Project ("P3P"). W3C subsequently
obtained an opinion of non-infringement from outside patent counsel and
published the opinion on its web site. See generally World Wide Web
Consortium, Analysis of P3P and US Patent 5,862,325, available at
http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P-analysis (Oct. 27, 1999).
118. See Mark A. Lemley, Standardizing Government Standard-Setting
Policy for Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 745, 751-52 (1999)
(noting that "as a rule intellectual property ownership in a de facto standard is
inimical to open standard setting").
119. Open Source.Org, The Open Source Initiative: Home Page,
http://www.opensource.org (last visited May 16, 2001).
120. GNU's Not Unix at http://www.fsf.org (last visited May 16, 2001). The
Free Software Foundation's objections to proprietary rights in software are set
forth by Richard Stallman, Why Software Should Not Have Owners, available
at http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/why-free.html (last visited May 16, 2001).
121. See M. Craig Tyler and J. Wesley Jones, Open-Source Software Raises
Licensing Issues, Too, NAT'L L.J., May 14, 2001, at C14 (arguing that opensource software is not in reality completely free of proprietary rights, and
discussing "copyleft" protection of open-source code).
122. See Seltzer, supra note 33, at 53. Some commentators believe that
Open Source proponents are behind the September 2000 votes by Germany,
France, Italy and other countries having representation in the Administrative
Council of the European Patent not to delete the prohibition on patenting
computer programs "as such" from Article 52(2) of the European Patent
Convention. Erwin J. Basinski, An Open-and-Shut Case: The Diplomatic
Conference to Revise the Articles of the European Patent Office Votes to
Maintain the Status Quo Regarding Software Patents in Europe Pending
Issuance of a New Software Patent Directive by the European Union, 6 INT'L. J.
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that Congress could altogether forbid patenting in standards
technology.'23
Any per se exclusion from the patenting of technical
innovation encompassed in industry standards would be unwise
for a number of reasons.
Historically, technology-specific
exclusions from patentability have rarely been implemented in
U.S. patent law. 124 Such exclusions would also likely run afoul of
U.S. international trade obligations. 25
More importantly, without patenting's promise of timelimited exclusionary control to permit recoupment of innovation
costs,"' it is unlikely that an optimal level of research and
development would occur in certain standards technologies. In the
case of standards technology that is highly complicated and
expensive to develop, "the availability and quality of the standard
may very much depend on the reward provided, or not provided, by
intellectual property law." 27 The first-mover advantage simply
may not be enough to spur the requisite level of innovation in
these sophisticated technology markets. The development of
compact disc (CD) technology and the extensive patent holdings
that allowed Philips and Sony to dominate the CD industry (and
later, the Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) market) are a powerful
example.2
COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (Winter 2000/2001).
123. See Lemley, supra note 118, at 757 (suggesting that Congress could
"preclude ownership of industry standards altogether," or at least legislatively
permit copying of technology needed to achieve interoperability, as in
copyrighted application programming interfaces (APIs)).
124. The only technology-specific subject matter exclusions from patenting
currently recognized in U.S. law involve inventions directed to national
security and nuclear technology. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2001) (authorizing
withholding of patent grants on inventions "detrimental to the national
security"); 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2001) ("No patent shall hereafter be granted
for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special
nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon.")
125. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Uruguay Round
Agreements, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), Art. 27(1) (1994) (providing that, subject to limited exceptions,
"patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes,
in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive
step and are capable of industrial application").
126. I propose herein that owners of patents on industry standards
technology retain their right to completely exclude other competitors or to
voluntarily license those competitors at terms set by the patentee, safeguarded
from imposition of compulsory licensing, so long as the patent owners fully
disclosed their relevant patents and patent applications to the standardssetting body in a timely fashion that would have permitted the body to select
alternative, non-patented technology. See Part V, infra.
127. David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: An Economic
Approach, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1994).
128. See SHAPIRO AND VARIAN, supra note 31, at 271 (noting that the patent
portfolios of Sony and Philips were their "core assets" in the areas of CD and
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The availability of patent protection may be especially
important where the standard is a de facto one. In the absence of
formal standard-setting (or where formal standard-setting is
significantly delayed), a particular product or technology may
become a de facto standard simply because it is preferred and
adopted by the majority of industry participants. 9 If the product
is not protected by patent or other intellectual property protection
and can be freely copied, the firm that developed the technology
may not be able to recoup its research and development costs,
much less make a profit for its contribution.130
Patent rights that intersect with government-mandated
The
health and safety standards are a more difficult case.'
government can make compliance with its standards mandatory
through imposition of fines or other penalties for non-compliance,
while adherence to standards generated by industry consortia, at
least in theory, is optional.'32 The potential for unfair exploitation
of users of government-mandated standards is significant, for
these firms must employ the patented technology and will be
required to pay whatever the patentee demands in terms of
royalties.
Rather than creating a two-tiered system of
patentability rules for dealing with patents on subject matter that
is the subject of government standards, the better approach is to
permit such patents to issue but to limit their enforcement. To
remedy this situation, I suggest in the next Part that when a
technology standard is mandated by the federal government, the
government should consider exercising its eminent domain power
over patents that the owner refuses to license widely on
commercially reasonable terms.
DVD technology). See also Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice
Department Approves Joint Licensing of Patents Essential for Making DVDVideo and DVD-ROM Discs and Players (Dec. 17, 1998) (approving pooling of
patents on DVD technology by Philips, Sony, and Pioneer) available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/1998/2120.htm.
129. For example, Microsoft's Windows operating system was not developed
by industry as a de jure standard, but is surely a de facto standard by virtue of
its overwhelming market share. See Seltzer, supra note 33, at 51.
130. Spoor, supra note 29, at 369-70. This result is no different for
innovators in the absence of standards; the distinguishing fact is the position
of third parties. Id. at 370. Once a standard has been adopted, third parties
are forced to copy the technology that is essential to the standard. Id.
131. See Press Release, Attorney General Bill Lockyer, Attorney General Bill
Lockyer Files "Friend of the Court" Brief Over Unocal Gasoline Patent,
California Attorney General Press Releases 00-122 (Sept. 14, 2000) available
at http://caag.state.ca.us/press/2000idx.htm (warning in amicus curiae brief to
U.S. Supreme Court that, in addition to Unocal's patents on clean fuel
formulations, "other companies may seek patents for other products that the

state may mandate for public health and safety").
132. Industry participants could choose to forego the industry standard and
develop successful alternatives, much as the Apple Macintosh operating
system was developed as an alternative to DOS and Windows-based systems.

The John MarshallLaw Review
V.

[34:897

EXPANDING THE PATENT MISUSE DOCTRINE TO REMEDY
ABusIvE STANDARDS CAPTURE

A number of remedies may apply when patents on the subject
matter of industry standards conflict with the full achievement of
the purposes of those standards. In this Part, I briefly discuss
several non-patent law remedies that have been applied in earlier
cases of standards capture, including antitrust and contract-based
remedies (fraud, equitable estoppel, and implied license). Because
of inherent limitations in these remedies, I propose the application
of the patent law-derived remedies of mandatory disclosure,
compulsory licensing and patent misuse-based non-enforcement to
target certain cases of standards abuse by patent owners.
A. Antitrust Law
The capture of industry standards has been previously
remedied through the use of governmental antitrust enforcement
actions, such as the FTC's consent decree in In re Dell Computer
Corp.."' In addition to actions based on the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the Sherman Act provides authority for
government antitrust enforcement as well as for private party
antitrust lawsuits.8 4 These actions are generally brought under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power through anticompetitive
conduct."' The party asserting a Section 2 violation must show
that the patentee has monopoly power in the relevant market, and
that it has acquired and is maintaining that power in an
anticompetitive manner.136
133. See generally 121 F.T.C. 616, 1996 FTC LEXIS 291 (1996).
134. See § 2 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001) (providing that "[elvery
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony .... "); § 4 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (establishing
jurisdiction of federal district courts over private party treble damages actions
by "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... ").
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001) (providing that "[elvery person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony .... ).
136. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 703 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
The Court in Grinnell held that:
[t]he offense of monopoly under §§ 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.

20011

PatentingIndustry Standards

In practice, the requirement for a showing of market power
excludes much of typical patent owner behavior from antitrust
prosecution."'
The successful assertion of an antitrust
counterclaim against a patent owner bringing an infringement
suit is relatively rare because of certain antitrust protections given
to intellectual property holders. The mere fact that a firm owns a
patent on an industry standard does not itself demonstrate market
power in the antitrust sense, because antitrust law recognizes the
possibility of non-infringing substitutes for the patented
technology."
As applied by the Federal Circuit,139 antitrust
doctrine preserves the patentee's immunity unless the defendant
establishes either that (i) the patent was obtained from the
USPTO through knowing and willful fraud within the meaning of
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem.
Corp.,"' or (ii) the infringement suit is a "mere sham" to cover
what is in reality "an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor.""' Thus, the owner of a
patent on an industry standard who seeks to enforce its statutory
right through bringing a patent infringement suit against a nonlicensed user of the standard enjoys presumptive immunity from
antitrust liability, even if maintenance of the infringement suit
would have anticompetitive effect.
Several
commentators
propose that
the structural
impediments to antitrust enforcement against patent owners could
be circumvented by treating industry standards as "essential
facilities" under U.S. antitrust doctrine.'
The essential facilities
Id.
137. See Robert Merges, Reflections on Current LegislationAffecting Patent
Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 793, 793 (1988) (noting that "the

often very limited (or 'thin') markets for patented technology make it difficult
to apply antitrust law's consumer-demand definition of the relevant market").
138. See Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
139. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068

(Fed. Cir. 1998).
140. 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).
141. See In re Ind. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Lit., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2000). The Noerr-Pennington doctrine of antitrust law provides that an
attempt to influence the government (e.g., by the filing of a patent

infringement lawsuit) is generally immune from antitrust liability. Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138-39
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965). An
exception exists to Noerr-Penningtonantitrust immunity for "sham litigation,"
where the defendant establishes that the litigation is objectively baseless. See

Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49,
60-61 (1993) (discussing the two-part definition of "sham" litigation). See also

Filmtec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931, 937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (detailing
contours of "sham litigation" exception under Professional Real Estate
Investors in patent cases).
142. Wendy Milanese, The Tension Must Break: The IrreconcilableInterplay
Between Antitrust Defenses to Infringement and Protection of Standardized
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doctrine provides that it is an antitrust violation for the owner of
an essential facility (i.e., a "facility" essential for firms to compete)
43
to deny access to that facility at nondiscriminatory terms.
Courts have held that a local electricity monopoly, a stadium, and
In the classic essential
a railroad are essential facilities. 4
facilities case United States v. Terminal R.R. Assoc. , " the
Supreme Court required that a cartel of railroads collectively
owning the only railroad switching yard in
St. Louis give all the
14 6
railroads access to the yard on equal terms.
Despite the seeming attractiveness of the essential facilities
doctrine, courts have routinely rejected its application. 4 7 For
example, in Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, the Ninth Circuit
held that the United Airline's computer reservation system was
not an essential facility because United's practices merely resulted
in imposing higher costs on United's competitor, the plaintiff
Alaska Airlines, rather
than eliminating Alaska from
competition. " ' The same rationale could be applied to preclude
application of the essential facilities doctrine in the case of

Software Development Tools, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
407, 438 n.4 (1999) (suggesting that "an owner of software technology [that
has become a standard] could be liable under the essential facility doctrine");
Lemley, supra note 25, at 1084; E. Robert Yoches, Licensing Patents For
Software and Computer Technology, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY (Jan.
1995), at 8 (noting that essential facilities doctrine "has not been applied to
standards, but an aggrieved litigant could argue that a patentee controls an
essential facility if its patent covers an industry standard necessary to make,
use or sell certain equipment").
143. See Milanese, supra note 142, at 438 n.4; See also Alaska Airlines, Inc.
v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Stated most
generally, the essential facilities doctrine imposes liability when one firm,
which controls an essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a
product or service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with
the first").
144. See Milanese, supra note 142, at 438 n.4 (citing, e.g., Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 (1973)) (citing with approval district
court's finding that electric utility's "refusals to sell at wholesale or to wheel
were solely to prevent municipal power systems from eroding its monopolistic
position"); see also United States v. Terminal R.R. Assoc., 224 U.S. 383 (1912);
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that
district court prejudicially erred by refusing to instruct jury on potential
applicability of essential facilities doctrine to defendants' football stadium).
145. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
146. Id. at 411-12. See Lemley, supra note 25, at 1084 (discussing the
doctrine of "essential facilities").
147. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 543-45; Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider
Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a sales
force was not an "essential facility" because the potential for competition was
not eliminated by its withdrawal); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union
Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376-80 (7th Cir. 1986).
148. 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
149. Id. at 545-46.

20011

PatentingIndustry Standards

standards promulgated by industry consortia, with which
compliance is technically voluntary. Legal scholars have also
criticized the essential facilities doctrine, which Professor Areeda
has termed "an epithet in need of limiting principles."' °
Although significant difficulties may arise in proceeding
against standards patentees under U.S. antitrust law given the
limitations of the essential facilities doctrine and the breadth of a
patent owner's presumptive immunity, antitrust-style remedies
may be more viable for standards users in Europe. Applying
European competition jurisprudence addressing "abuse of a
dominant position," 5 ' the European Commission in July 2001
ordered compulsory licensing as a remedy when the owner of
copyright in a proprietary system for collecting data on German
pharmaceutical sales of drugs that had become a "national
standard" refused to license its competitors."12 The Commission
noted that the refusal to license an intellectual property right is
not normally considered to be an abuse of a dominant position. 153
Compulsory licensing was justified in this case, however, because
the German pharmaceutical industry had contributed to the
development of the copyrighted system, there was no viable
substitute for the system, and the system was therefore
"indispensable" to operation of the German pharmaceutical
industry."
B. Fraud
Besides antitrust action, other remedies have been employed
in private party litigation against those who participate in
standards-setting while failing to disclose pertinent patent rights.
One such approach involves bringing a cause of action for fraud.
In a pivotal case for the semiconductor industry, '5" a Virginia jury
150. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet In Need of Limiting
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989); see also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that "the viability and
scope of the essential facility theory has occasioned much scholarly
commentary"); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN AND JEFFREY L. HARRISON,
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 306 (3d

ed. 1998) (describing essential facilities doctrine as "fairly dormant").
151. See Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome)
Art. 82 (listing examples of "abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position
within
the
common
market"),
available
at
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/treaties en.htm (last visited July 17, 2001).
152. See Press Release, Commission Imposes Interim Measures on IMS
HEALTH
In
Germany
(July
3,
2001),
available
at

http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh
2001).
153. Id.
154. Id.

(last visited July 13,

155. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Rambus Must Pay Damages, THE
WASHINGTON POST, May 10, 2001, at El (describing Rambus litigation against

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:897

ordered that Rambus, Inc., a California designer of high-speed
computer memory chips, pay $3.5 million in punitive damages
based on verdicts of actual and constructive fraud. 156 Asserted by
defendant Infineon Technologies AG as a counterclaim to
Rambus's charges of patent infringement,'57 the fraud allegations
were based on Rambus's non-disclosure of patents that cover an
aspect of the standard developed by the Joint Electronic Devices
Engineering Council ("JEDEC") for synchronous dynamic random
access memory chips ("SDRAMs")." 8 Rambus, which plans to
appeal the verdict, contends that it complied with JEDEC's
disclosure policy, although it views the policies as "confusing,
conflicting, poorly communicated and generally not complied with
by other JEDEC members." 9
C. EquitableEstoppel /Implied License
The doctrines of equitable estoppel and implied license may
also operate in certain circumstances to prohibit a patent owner
from recovering for infringement if the owner fails to disclose the
existence of its proprietary rights to a standards-setting
organization, as illustrated by Wang Labs. v. Mitsubishi.'6° Wang
developed Single In-Line Memory Modules ("SIMMs") in the 1980s
and encouraged Mitsubishi to make 256K chips incorporating the
Infineon, one of a number of suits pending that involves the Rambus patents
on SDRAM technology, as "pivotal" for the industry).
156. See id.; Verdict Form, Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Tech., Inc., Civil Action
No.
3:00cv524
(E.D.
Va.
May
9,
2001),
available at
http://www.rambusite.com/RambusVsInfineon/Docket319.htm; see also Dan
Goodin, Rambus is Ordered by Jury to Pay $3.5 Million to Infineon Over

Patents, WALL STREET J., May 10, 2001, at B8; George Leopold, Update: Jury
Awards Infineon $3.5M on Fraud Charges, EETIMES.COM, May 9, 2001,
available at http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG20010509S0053.
157. See Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims, Rambus Inc. v. Infineon

Tech., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:00cv524 (E.D. Va. Sept. 25, 2000), available at
http://www.rambusite.com/RambusVsInfineon/Docket07.htm.
158. Goodin, supra note 156. Infmeon alleged that Rambus, as a member of

JEDEC, had a duty to disclose all patents and pending patent applications
relating to the SDRAM technology being standardized, and that Rambus
intentionally failed to disclose its relevant patents and pending applications
knowing that JEDEC's members would rely on Rambus's silence. Infineon

further contended that the SDRAM standard was adopted based on that
reliance, and that it suffered damages as a result of Rambus's failure to

disclose when Rambus sued it for infringement of the non-disclosed patents.
See Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 157, at 33-34 (Count 7
alleging "Actual Fraud") and 34-35 (Count 8 alleging "Constructive Fraud");
Leopold, supra note 156.
159. Therese Poletti, Rambus Found Guilty of Fraud,MERCURY NEWS, May

9, 2001, at 2 (quoting statement by Rambus Chief Executive Geoff Tate),
available
at
http://www0.mercurycenter.conL/business/center1/rambus0510.htm.

160. Wang Labs. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
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SIMMs. 16' Wang succeeded in its campaign to have the JEDEC
adopt SIMMs as a standard, without informing JEDEC that it was
seeking to patent the SIMMs technology.162
The Federal Circuit affirmed a district court's holding that
the accused infringer Mitsubishi was entitled to an irrevocable,
royalty-free implied license under Wang's patent, based on six
years of interaction between the parties that led Mitsubishi to
reasonably infer consent to its use of the invention Wang had
patented. 16 Although Wang did not itself make SIMMs and had
to buy them from other manufacturers such as Mitsubishi, Wang
benefitted from Mitsubishi's reliance in the form of lowered prices
as the market for SIMMs grew."
The Federal Circuit
acknowledged that its imposition of an implied license in Wang
was "in the nature of' equitable estoppel, a recognized but rarelyestablished defense in U.S. patent law,'65 but determined that "a
formal finding of equitable estoppel [was not required] as a
prerequisite to a legal conclusion of implied license."'66
A potential weakness of the implied license/equitable estoppel
defense as applied in industry standards cases is its requirement
that a defendant establish detrimental reliance on the patentee's
assertion that it would not enforce its patent. Third parties who
did not participate in the standards-setting activity and had no
contact with the patentee would be unable to establish detrimental
reliance. If those third parties ultimately had to infringe the
patent in order to practice the standard, they would not
necessarily benefit from another party's establishment of an
implied license/equitable estoppel defense.
A better approach would consider whether the owner of a
standards patent should be permitted, as a matter of public policy,
to enforce its patent, regardless of the degree of prior contact
between the patentee and the ultimate users of the standard.
Patent law-based doctrines such as patent misuse permit this
approach.

161. Id. at 1575.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1581-82.
164. Id. at 1579-80.
165. Id. at 1582. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const., 960 F.2d
1020, 1041-44 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (setting forth elements of equitable
estoppel and reversing district court's grant of summary judgment that
patentee was equitably estopped to assert patent infringement).
166. Wang, 103 F.3d at 1581. The implied license was not in the nature of

legal estoppel, the Federal Circuit explained, which "refers to a narrower
category of conduct encompassing scenarios where a patentee has licensed or
assigned a right, received consideration, and then sought to derogate from the
right granted." Id. (quoting Spindelfabrik v. Schubert, 829 F.2d 1075, 1080
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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D. Eminent Domain
Standards developed by the government rather than industry
merit separate treatment. The assertion of patent rights in the
subject matter of government-mandated technology standards
represents a uniquely difficult clash of policy concerns - protecting
the public's welfare versus maintaining sufficient incentives to
bring forth adequate levels of innovation in the technology of the
standards. There is little extant case law on this point, but what
exists supports the position that government-mandated public
health and safety requirements should, in some cases, trump the
exclusivity right of intellectual property owners. When the federal
government mandates a standard, particularly one related to
public health or safety, it is appropriate to require anyone holding
patent rights on the subject matter of the standard to license all
users on commercially reasonable terms.
In extreme cases, courts may interpret legislation protecting
public health as having effectively revoked conflicting intellectual
property rights. In the copyright case of SmithKline Beecham
Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc.,6' plaintiff
SmithKline asserted copyright in "labeling" material (i.e., a
written user's guide and an audiotape) that it had prepared and
submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") for
approval 8 in connection with its application to make over-thecounter ("OTC") sales of "Nicorette" gum, a product designed to
help smokers overcome the need for nicotine.69
When the
defendant Watson sought FDA approval to sell a generic
equivalent of Nicorette after the expiration of SmithKline's patent
on the gum, Watson submitted virtually identical copies of the
user's guide and audiotape to the FDA. 7 ' The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of SmithKline's lawsuit
alleging copyright infringement by Watson on the ground that the
FDA regulations require that generic manufacturers use "the
same" labeling 7' as that approved for the sale of the corresponding
pioneer drug.172 "Because [the Hatch-Waxman] Amendments were
designed to facilitate rather than impede the approval and OTC
sale of generic drugs, the FDA's requirement that Watson use
much of SmithKline's label precludes a copyright infringement
action by SmithKline.' 73

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 173 (2000).
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
See id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) and 21 C.F.R. § 314.127(a)(7)).
SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 24-25.
Id. The Second Circuit viewed its decision as a straightforward

resolution of conflict between the Copyright Act and the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Id. at 27. The
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Beyond copyright, public welfare concerns have led the courts
In these
in rare cases to refuse to enforce infringed patents.
cases, "the patentee's legitimate exercise of monopoly rights
conflicted sharply with a clear and immediate threat to public
welfare-and the patents were not enforced." 175 A classic case is
Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconisin Alumni Research
Found.,'7 in which the Ninth Circuit concluded that a patent
owner's refusal to license its process of irradiating foodstuffs to
increase Vitamin D content, helpful in the treatment of rickets, for
use with margarine, "the butter of the poor," justified the refusal
of the 177injunctive and accounting relief sought by the patent
owner.
Another setting in which governmental concerns for public
safety have prevailed over intellectual property owners' exclusivity
rights involves procurements of patented technology needed for
military defense purposes. Under the statutory framework of 28
U.S.C. § 1498, when the U.S. federal government needs to procure
a weapons system that is covered by a third party's patent, the
government can acquire and use that system from a different
supplier without fear of injunction."' The grant of a U.S. patent
on these systems is effectively subject to a non-exclusive but
court declined to examine the defendant's further contentions that its use of
the plaintiffs copyrighted label was permitted either under the copyright fair
use defense of 17 U.S.C. § 107 or an implied, non-exclusive license purportedly
granted to the FDA by SmithKline when it submitted the original label for
approval. Id. at 25.
174. See Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis, Alumni Res. Found., 146 F.2d
941, 944-45 (9th Cir. 1945); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69
F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) (affirming award of money damages for the city's
infringement of patent on sewage purification process but refusing to enjoin
infringement because doing so "would close the sewage plant, leaving the
entire community without any means for the disposal of raw sewage other
than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby polluting its waters and
endangering the health and lives of that and other adjoining communities").
175. Merges, supra note 137, at 796.
176. 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945).
177. Id. at 954-56. This holding is arguably dicta, however, the Ninth
Circuit also held the patents in suit invalid, and opined that "the public
interest is served better by our decision that the patents are invalid." Id. at
956.
178. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2001) providing in pertinent part that:
[w]henever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the
United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or
manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by action against
the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the
recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture.
Id. See Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1166 (Ct. Cl. 1980)
(explaining that "[tihe Government has a right to take patent licenses and
cannot be enjoined from doing this").
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royalty-bearing license in the federal government. Having waived
its sovereign immunity for patent infringement, the government
assumes any potential patent infringement liability on the part of
its suppliers through clauses in its procurement contracts,'79 and if
the procured system is found to infringe, the government will pay
a reasonable royalty to the patent owner.18 ° This statutory scheme
has been explained as a form of compulsory licensing in which the
federal government condemns a license and is obligated to pay just
compensation in accordance with Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause principles. 8'
Applying these principles to a setting in which the owner of a
patent on a government-imposed standard refuses to license
certain competitors, or offers licenses only at commercially
unreasonable rates, the standards users might initiate declaratory
judgment proceedings and assert non-liability in accordance with
the public policy rationale of SmithKline. Alternatively, the
federal government could consider eminent domain proceedings
against the patent owner, along the lines of the statutory scheme
found at 28 U.S.C. § 1498.182 Significant legislative amendment

179. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) providing that:
the use or manufacture of an invention described in and covered by a
patent of the United States by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any
person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with the
authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or
manufacture for the United States.
Id.
180. Decca, 640 F.2d at 1167 (identifying reasonable royalty computation as
"preferred method" of determining value of patent license taken by
government).
181. The U.S. federal government cannot be enjoined from infringing
another's U.S. patent, and it is deemed to have condemned a license in the
eminent domain sense when it infringes. See Decca, 640 F.2d at 1166. If the
federal government is found to have infringed, it must pay "justcompensation"
for the taking in accordance with the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1167 n.17. The
typical remedy for infringement by the government is a reasonable royalty.
Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 968 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The Leesona
court explained that:
[tihe nature of the property taken by the government in a patent
infringement suit has traditionally been a compulsory compensable
license in the patent, and just compensation has in most cases been
defined by a calculation of a "reasonable royalty" for that license, or,
when a reasonable royalty cannot be ascertained, another method of
estimating the value of the lost patent.
Id.
182. Contra CCC Info. Svcs. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d
61, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) stating that court was:
not prepared to hold that a state's reference to a copyrighted work as a
legal standard ...

results in loss of the copyright ....

[A] rule that the

adoption of such a reference by a state legislature or administrative
body deprived the copyright owner of its property would raise very
substantial problems under the Takings Clause of the Constitution.
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would be required, however, to extend the existing statutory
framework to infringements committed by parties other than the
U.S. federal government or those in contractual privity therewith;
i.e., to all entities8 3 that must comply with the governmentmandated standard.
E. Compulsory Licensing as a Sanction for Failure to Disclose
Patent Rights
The case for compulsory licensing to all users of a patented
standard is less compelling when the standard is merely a
consensus standard promulgated by an industry consortium rather
than one mandated by the government. In the case of industrygenerated standards, those who implement the standard are not
legally bound to do so.'" Compulsory licensing should be required
in this situation only as a penalty for failure to timely disclose
patent rights relevant to the standard.
Any firm that
participates8'8 in creating an industry standard and thereafter
obtains patent rights in some aspect of the standard must, at a
minimum, disclose the existence of any patents or pending patent
applications'8 6 that may be relevant to the standard.
Id.
183. Currently the statutory scheme only covers infringements that are
specifically authorized or consented to by the U.S. federal government, e.g., by
a government contractor. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2001) providing in part
that:
[flor the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a
contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the
Government and with the authorization or consent of the Government,
shall be construed as use or manufacture for the United States.

Id.
184. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
185. The degree of "participation" necessary to trigger such a disclosure
requirement is at issue in the ongoing Rambus patent litigation over
standards for SDRAM computer memory. Cha, supra note 155, at El.
Rambus filed its parent patent application on SDRAM technology before
joining the Joint Electronic Devices Engineering Council (JEDEC), but
amended the claims of its pending applications while a member of JEDEC.
Michael Kanellos, Infineon Fights On With Rambus Countersuit, NEWS.COM
(May 7, 2001), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-200-5848778.html. The
patents issued after Rambus withdrew from JEDEC. Id. Rambus contends
that it was a passive member of JEDEC, attending meetings but never
advocating or voting on standards related to its patent. Id.
186. Some commentators question whether patent applications, as opposed
to issued patents, should be subject to a disclosure obligation. See Baumann,
supra note 31, at 3 (identifying this issue as an "open question" and noting
that applications "represent a work in progress that is kept secret during the
examination process" and that "the claims of a patent application likely will
change as the application is examined at the Patent Office"). The issue is to
some extent moot because, as discussed in the text, most newly-filed U.S.
patent applications will be automatically published eighteen months after
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The proposed disclosure obligation for standards-setting
participants would parallel that created by the existing body of
inequitable conduct case law'87 and the USPTO regulations placing
a duty of candor on all patent applicants in their dealings with the
agency.'88 The duty of candor requires disclosure to the agency of
any information, known to the applicant, which is material to
patentability.'
The boundaries of this disclosure obligation are
their earliest priority date.
More broadly, the necessity that standards-makers possess full and complete
information of any potential proprietary rights in the subject matter of a
standard in development justifies requiring all standards-setting participants
to make full and immediate disclosure of pending patent applications. Cf.
Electronic Industries Alliance, JEDECManual of Organizationand Procedure
JM21-K
Annex
F
42
(Feb.
2,
1999),
available
at
http://www.jedec.org/Home/manuals/m21k.pdf
(visited July 21, 2001)
(mandating that standards which require use of patented technology "may not
be considered by a JEDEC committee unless all of the relevant technical
information covered by the patent or pending patent is known") (emphasis
added). The failure to implement a requirement for timely disclosure of
pending patent applications would deprive standards-setting organizations of
the option to adopt an alternative standard that utilized non-proprietary
technology. See In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 1996 FTC LEXIS
291, *15 (1996) (contending that enforcement action was appropriate where
evidence established that standards-setting body "would have implemented a
different non-proprietary design had it been informed of the patent conflict
during the certification process, and where [patentee] failed to act in good
faith to identify and disclose patent conflicts").
187. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03 (2001)

("Fraudulent Procurement-Inequitable Conduct") (summarizing "vast" body
of inequitable conduct case law and literature).
188. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2001).
189. See id. at § 1.56(a) providing that:
[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the
Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information
known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in
this section.
Id. The USPTO regulations further define "material to patentability" as:
[information that] is not cumulative to information already of record or
being made of record in the application, and
1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a
prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes
in:

(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the
Office, or
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the
information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the
preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term
in the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the
specification, and before any consideration is given to evidence which
may be submitted in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of
patentability.
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familiar to all patent applicants and their patent counsel, and
compliance with parallel rules in the standards-setting arena
should not represent an additional undue burden on standardssetting participants.
Mandating the disclosure of all relevant patent holdings to
the standards-setting body is essential. Mandatory disclosure
preserves for the standards-setting body the option to decide
whether it will adopt a standard that requires the use of the
patented technology or develop a different standard that avoids it
altogether.' 90 Imposing the threat of compulsory licensing for
failure to comply with the disclosure requirement will help to
ensure compliance, as does the risk that patents, which are
procured through intentional withholding of material prior art
from the USPTO, may be rendered unenforceable for inequitable
conduct. Moreover, if an industry standard is ultimately adopted
that requires the use of a patent that was not timely disclosed
during the standard-setting activity, the imposition of compulsory
licensing will ensure that all users of the standard will be able to
practice the patent without fear of injunction.
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC) imposed compulsory
licensing without remuneration for the patentee as the remedy in
In re Dell Computer Corporation,"' a ground-breaking FTC
antitrust enforcement action. Dell had participated in setting the
Video Electronics Standards Association ("VESA") standard for the
VESA Local Bus or "VL-bus" (a computer hardware device that
carries instructions between a computer's CPU [central processing
unit] and its peripheral devices),19 ' without disclosing that it
owned a patent on an aspect of the VL-Bus design.'93 The FTC
cited evidence indicating that had the VESA been aware of Dell's
patent, it would have implemented a different, non-proprietary

Id. at § 1.56 (b).
190. Hyundai, a party to the ongoing Rambus patent litigation, see supra
note 185, contends that JEDEC was also denied this option when it developed
the SDRAM standard. Cha, supra note 155, at El. See Kanellos, supra note

185, at 2 (quoting Hyundai lawyer Patrick Lynch as contending that "[i]f
Rambus had disclosed these patents at JEDEC ...these standards would
never have been adopted.... The intent was to have an open standard").
191. 121 F.T.C. 616, 1996 FTC LEXIS 291 (1996).

192. Id. at 1996 FTC LEXIS 291, *2.
193. Id. at *3. Dell obtained U.S. Patent No. 5,036,481 before it joined
VESA's Local Bus Committee, but did not disclose the patent's existence to
VESA. Id. at *2-*3. Voting on VESA's proposed VL-bus design standard,
Dell's representative certified in writing that the proposed standard did not
infringe any intellectual property rights owned by Dell. Id. at *3. Dell

thereafter threatened to sue firms planning to follow the VL-bus standard for
infringement of its patent. Id. at *3-*4. The FTC majority concluded that
Dell's actions constituted "unfair methods of competition in or affecting

commerce" in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58). Id. at *5.
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design. 19 4 Finding that Dell's actions constituted "unfair methods
of competition in or affecting commerce" in violation of Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act,19 the FTC imposed a consent
order that broadly prohibited Dell from enforcing its '481 patent
against "any person or entity... using or applying VL-bus in its
91 6
manufacture of computer equipment" for the life of the patent.
In effect, the FTC required that Dell grant royalty-free licenses
under its patent to anyone using Dell's patented technology to
practice the VL-bus standard. 1"7
The dissenting Commissioner in Dell Computer attacked the
majority for imposing "a strict liability standard, under which a
company would place its intellectual property at risk simply by
participating in the standards-setting process." 9 ' She pointed out
that simply being aware of the existence of a patent does not
equate with an awareness that it infringes a given standard, 99 a
point well-taken in view of the uncertainty of determining patent
infringement under current Federal Circuit case law.9 ° Other
commentators have questioned the ability of any major
corporation to identify with certainty any and all patent holdings
that will be implicated by the practice of a given standard, and
some firms strongly oppose the imposition of a disclosure
requirement.'
Because many firms that participate in standardssetting have extensive patent portfolios,'
standards-setting

194. Id. at 291, *15. The FTC majority opined that the wide acceptance of
VESA's VL-bus standard "effectively conferred market power upon Dell as the
patent holder," id. at *15 n.2, and that this market power "was not inevitable."
Id. For these reasons, enforcement action for "unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce" in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58, was considered appropriate by the

majority. Id. at *15.
195. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1) (2001).
196. Dell Computer, 1996 FTC LEXIS 291, at *8.
197. Id. at *36-*37 (Commissioner Azcuenaga, dissenting).

198. Id. at *29 (Commissioner Azcuenaga, dissenting).
199. Id.
200. Cf.Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting study reporting that approximately
40% of patent claim determinations are reversed on appeal to the Federal
Circuit).
201. See Dell Computer, 1996 FTC LEXIS at *40 (Commissioner Azcuenaga,

dissenting) (stating that seven of the eleven public comments received in
response to FTC's Federal Register notice of proposed consent order "strongly

opposed the imposition on participants in the standards-setting process of any
duty to identify and disclose patents").

202. See

Letter

of

Dan

Bart,

Electronic

Industries

Association

(EIA)/Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) Vice President, to
Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 22, 1996) (on file with author), at 3 (stating
that "[miany of the larger member companies [that participate in the process
of voluntary standards development] have literally tens of thousands of
patents").
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organizations contend that having to conduct exhaustive patent
searches prior to participating in standards-setting represents a
significant resource burden that will chill the participation of
03
those firms."
Such concerns are likely over-stated. Many standards-setting
organizations already impose requirements that their participants
2
04
make full disclosure of any relevant intellectual property rights.
Moreover, firms with large patent portfolios must already address
the resource problems engendered by ensuring compliance with
their duty to disclose information material to patentability to the
USPTO. °5 Patent owners who seek to position their technology as
an industry standard must accept the burden of maintaining
thorough oversight of their patent portfolios as a cost of doing
business in industries that give rise to standards.0 6 An expansive
disclosure requirement is not likely to chill industry participation
in standards-setting, because "participation in standards-setting is
motivated by commercial self-interest and is not a form of
community service." °7
If compulsory licensing is imposed as a remedy for nondisclosure of patent rights pertinent to industry standards as
proposed herein, some competent authority must set a licensing
203. See id. at 4 (stating position of EIA/TIA that FTC's decision in Dell
Computer "should not be interpreted to place an affirmative duty on
companies to perform exhaustive patent searches in order to participate in

standards activities. Such a requirement would deter many companies in the
electronics and communications industries from engaging in standards
development, especially larger companies with extensive patent interests").
See also Dell Computer, 1996 FTC LEXIS 291 at *40 (Commissioner

Azcuenaga, dissenting) (noting comments received by FTC from American
National Standards Institute (ANSI), in opposition to "the imposition of any
affirmative duty to identify and disclose patents, because it would chill
participation in standards development").
204. See supra notes 54-56 in Part II.C, "Intellectual Property Policies" and
accompanying text.
205. In fact, large firms are less likely to be negatively impacted by a
standards-setting disclosure obligation than small firms. See Baumann, supra

note 31, at 3 (noting that "[1large companies have resources to track
disclosures and educate employees who attend standards meetings, but
smaller companies lack the resources to perform either of these services").
206. Cf. Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997),

stating in context of doctrine of equivalents analysis that:
[gliven a choice of imposing the higher costs of careful prosecution on

patentees, or imposing the costs of foreclosed business activity on the
public at large, this court believes the costs are properly imposed on the
group best positioned to determine whether or not a particular invention
warrants investment at a higher level, that is, the patentees.

Id.
207. In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 1996 FTC LEXIS 291, *46

(1996) (Commissioner Azcuenaga, dissenting) (citing four of the eleven public
comments received in response to FTC's Federal Register notice of proposed
consent order).
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fee structure that will determine the patentee's remuneration. 8°
The perceived difficulty of quantifying a commercially reasonable
royalty "has long been a leading argument against adoption of
compulsory licensing in the U.S."" 9 Permitting the patent owner
to set the royalty at any desired level is for all practical purposes
to permit the patentee to refuse to license, and would defeat the
underlying purpose of the compulsory licensing - providing access
to the patented invention for all users of the industry standard.
Panels of industry experts should be created to set licensing fee
schedules for standards in particular industries, rather than
delegating the task to a government official or agency possessing
less familiarity with the industry standard in question.2"'
F. Patent Misuse

Very few courts have applied the patent misuse doctrine to
the problem of industry standards capture via patenting, and
those that have reject the misuse defense.'
The most likely
208. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Uruguay Round
Agreements, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Art. 31(h) (1994) (providing that where a member country's law
provides for compulsory licensing, "the right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the
economic value of the authorization").
209. See Mueller, supra note 39, at 63 (citing EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE
ECONOMICS

OF THE INTERNATIONAL

PATENT SYSTEM

172 (1951) (listing

difficulty of reasonable royalty determination as one of six primary arguments
against compulsory licensing).
210. See Milanese, supra note 142, at 437 (proposing establishment of "an
independent body of industry persons to determine the appropriate royalty or
licensing fee" for licensing patents on standardized software tools).
211. For example, an accused infringer's patent misuse counterclaim was
dismissed in a recent case alleging infringement of patents covering an
industry standard for 56K modems. See generally Townshend v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5070, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
Townshend obtained several patents on 56K modem technology, which he
subsequently licensed to 3Com Corporation. Id. at 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5070, *4-*5. After lobbying by Townshend and 3Com, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) adopted Townshend's patented technology
as the V.90 industry standard for 56K modems. Id. at *6-*7. Accused
infringers Rockwell and Conexant Systems, Inc., alleged that Townshend
refused to license them under the patents at reasonable commercial terms,
instead requiring "unfair royalty rates, double-charging of customers and
manufacturers, mandatory cross-licenses, and reservation of the right to
condition licenses on the resolution of litigation." Id. at *22. The defendants
charged that Townshend's licensing tactics amounted to patent misuse, as well
as antitrust violation, unfair competition under state law, and inequitable
conduct. Id. at *5. Holding that the defendants had failed to establish any
anti-competitive conduct, the district court rejected the patent misuse defense.
Id. at *46-47. Because "a complete refusal to license does not constitute patent
misuse," id. at *47, the court held, Townshend's statement of proposed
licensing terms also "cannot constitute patent misuse." Id. The Townshend
court gave significant weight to the fact that, unlike the scenario of In re Dell
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reasons for the rejection of the misuse defense are the statutory
limitations imposed by the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988,
including the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) that protect a
patent owner's refusal to license its patent from patent misuse
scrutiny.212 Below, I examine the development of those statutory
limitations and conclude that they should not prevent courts from
applying the patent misuse doctrine to curb standards abuse by
patent owners.
Patent misuse is a rather amorphous doctrine,21 generally
understood as "a method of limiting abuse of patent rights
separate from the antitrust laws.""4 Different policies ground
patent misuse and antitrust doctrine. Misuse focuses primarily on
the patentee's behavior in expanding the scope of its rights beyond
the statutory patent grant, while antitrust measures the impact of
that behavior on the marketplace.2 15 The misuse doctrine has its

Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 1996 FTC LEXIS 291 (1996), Townshend had
disclosed his pending patent applications as well as his proposed licensing
terms to the ITU during its standards-setting deliberations, and that the ITU
thereafter adopted Townshend's technology as the standard with full
knowledge of the patents and proposed licensing terms. Id. Accordingly, the
district court granted plaintiff Townshend's motion to dismiss the patent
misuse counterclaim. Id. FTC Chairman Pitofsky has criticized Townshend
as "illustrating the way CSU v. Xerox may be misused." Pitofsky, supra note
33, at 546 n.27 (citing Townshend court's dismissal of antitrust counterclaims
on ground that patentee has legal right to refuse to license on any terms).
212. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 25, at 1061 n.69:
One might interpret the patent misuse doctrine as a rule compelling
interoperability [of IP law and industry standards] in limited
circumstances. The problem with this approach is that Congress
appears to have foreclosed it in 1988, when it passed the Patent Misuse
Reform Act. That Act added 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4), which provides that
refusal to license a patent does not constitute patent misuse.
Id.
213. Professor Chisum observes in the misuse area "the absence of a clear
and general theory for resolving the problem of what practices should be
viewed as appropriate exercises of the patent owner's statutory patent rights."
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2001). But given that
misuse is a doctrine based in equity, the lack of clarity is hardly surprising.
See Merges, supra note 137, at 796 (noting that "[tihe nature of equity is that
it is somewhat 'messy"').
214. B. Braun Med. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
215. Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse
Reform Act and Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antritrust
Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 187 (1988-89) (explaining that the
antitrust laws are "intended to foreclose unreasonable restraints of trade and
illegal monopolies," and consequently bear severe punishments for violators,
while patent misuse doctrine, which merely suspends patent owner's right to
recover for infringement, "'prevent[s] a patentee from projecting the economic
effect of his admittedly valid grant beyond the limits of his legal monopoly,'"
which effect can occur "regardless of whether the defendant in a patent
infringement action is injured or a monopoly in trade and commerce results")
(emphasis added) (quoting Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc.,
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genesis in judicial decisions that pre-date any significant
development of U.S. antitrust law.1 6 Procedurally, patent misuse
is asserted as an affirmative defense to an allegation of patent
infringement.217
As with the parallel doctrine of copyright misuse,218 the roots
of patent misuse lie in the equitable doctrine of unclean hands,2"9
"whereby a court of equity will not lend its support to enforcement
of a patent that has been misused."22 ° Application of the misuse
that draw "anticompetitive
doctrine seeks to restrain practices
22
strength" from the patent right. '
Although the patent misuse doctrine has been broadly defined
as preventing a patent owner from using its patent in a manner
contrary to the public interest, this characterization is too
indefinite to provide any meaningful notice to a patentee of the
boundaries of prohibited conduct.2 2 In practice, determinations of

468 F.2d 225, 231 (7th Cir. 1972)).
216. USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
217. Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir.
1986).

218. See generally Brett Frischmann and Dan Moylan, The Evolving
Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its
Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865 (2000). The doctrine of
copyright misuse derives from the unclean hands doctrine and bars a
copyright owner from prevailing in an action for infringement of the misused
copyright. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.
1990) (finding copyright misuse where software copyright owner's license
prohibited licensee from developing any kind of related software, not just that
protected by copyright). The accused infringer bears the burden of establishing
that the owner used its copyright to gain rights in unprotected material. See
id. at 979 (holding that "[tihe misuse arises from Lasercomb's attempt to use
its copyright in a particular expression, the Interact software, to control

competition in an area outside the copyright, i.e., the idea of computer-assisted
die manufacture, regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an antitrust
violation"). A finding of copyright misuse does not invalidate the copyright,
and the copyright owner may sue for infringement after purging the misuse.
See id. at 979 n.22. The courts have relied on public policy arguments rather
than antitrust principles in evaluating the copyright misuse defense. See
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978. See generally Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs.,
Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med.
Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
219. In a recent "unclean hands" case a Northern District of California judge
declared a patent unenforceable for "inequitable conduct" that had occurred
during the litigation to enforce the patent (rather than the typical inequitable
conduct involving procurement of the patent in the USPTO). See Aptix Corp.
v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., No. C98-00762 WHA, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8408, at *87-95 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2000) (declaring patent in suit
unenforceable based on inventor/CEO's fabrication of invention date evidence
after commencement of infringement suit).
220. B. Braun Med. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
221. Windsurfing Int'l, 782 F.2d at 1001-02.
222. See USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 510 (asserting that such a vague
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patent misuse have been based upon a fairly narrow range of
specific acts or practices of the patent owner,223 often (but not
exclusively) in the context of patent licensing. 24 The key inquiry is
whether, by imposing a challenged condition (e.g., the imposition
of an onerous term in a license granted under the patent), the
patent owner has "impermissibly broadened the 'physical or
temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect." 25
A paradigm case of patent misuse involves a patentee "tying"
the grant of a patent license to the licensee's promise to purchase
from the patent owner a non-patented, staple good. In Morton
Salt v. Suppnger, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to enforce the
patent in suit where the patent owner had conditioned the grant of
licenses to use its patented salt tablet deposition machines upon
the licensees' purchase of unpatented salt tablets from the patent
owner.2 Although the Court concluded that this tying constituted
patent misuse that justified non-enforcement of the patent, the
offense in Morton Salt did not necessarily rise to the level of an
antitrust violation because no evidence existed that the patent
owner's licensing practice "substantially lessened competition or
tended to create a monopoly in salt tablets."228 Although the
patentee could not enjoin the infringement, it did not face
antitrust remedies such as the imposition of treble damages.2 9
Nor was the misused patent held permanently unenforceable,
because misuse can be "purged" by alleviating a challenged
condition.2"'

formulation, if "taken seriously... would put all patent rights at hazard").

223. Id.
224. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.0413]

(2001) ("Acts of Misuse"). Although the majority of patent misuse cases have
examined a patentee's licensing practices, the misuse defense has also been
raised in a case involving restrictions placed by the patent owner on the

conditions of post-sale use of its patented device. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reversing grant of summary
judgment of unenforceability based on patent misuse and remanding for
determination of whether post-sale restriction was valid under applicable
sales law and within scope of patent grant).

225. Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1001 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)).

226. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
227. Id. at 489-90, 494.
228. Id. at 490. See also Calkins, supra note 215, at 183 (concluding that
"Morton Salt reinforced the Court's earlier rulings that the misuse defense
was grounded on public policy underlying the patent laws and was not limited
to a violation of the antitrust laws ....
")
229. Id. at 490. See also § 4 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2001)(providing
treble damages remedy).
230. See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493, stating that:
[elquity may rightly withhold its assistance from... [a misuse] of the
patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement, and should do
so at least until it is made to appear that the improper practice has been
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Notably, the defendant/accused infringer in Morton Salt was
not itself a "victim" of the misuse, because it was not a licensee. 3'
In the Court's view, the true victim of the misuse was the public at
large. The Court refused to enforce the patent on public policy
grounds:
[T]he public policy which includes inventions within the granted
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention.
It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right
or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it is
contrary to public policy to grant.28'
Thus, since Morton Salt, an accused infringer asserting a
patent misuse defense is not required to show that it was
personally harmed by the misuse. 33
This liberal notion of
"standing" to assert the patent misuse defense, justified on public
policy grounds, supports the proposition that a patent misuse
defense should be potentially available to any entity denied a
license to practice a patent on an industry standard, regardless of
that entity's prior interactions with the patentee. The patent
misuse defense should not be limited to only those standards users
who actually participated with the patentee in the standardssetting negotiations and detrimentally relied on the patentee's
non-disclosure of its patent holdings. 4
The 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act limitations on patent
misuse dealt with the problematic intersection of that doctrine and
the doctrine of contributory infringement. 2 5
An assertion of
abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have
been dissipated."
Id. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04[41 (2001)

("Purging and Dissipaton of Misuse").
231. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490-91, 494.
232. Id. at 492.
233. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04[5] (2001).
234. But see Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent
Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1618-19 (1990) (criticizing patent
misuse doctrine in part because availability of patent misuse remedy (in effect,
a royalty-free compulsory license) for parties not actually harmed by the

misuse contravenes goals of patent system because it "unnecessarily rewards
(and therefore encourages) infringement").

235. The doctrine of contributory patent infringement, statutorily codified at
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) in the 1952 Patent Act, originated in judicial decisions such
as Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (No. 17,100) (C.C. Conn. 1871). Under a

theory of joint tort-feasance, the Wallace court held liable for infringement the
defendant supplier of a burner which, when combined by consumers with a

chimney, resulted in direct infringement of the plaintiffs patent on the overall
lamp device comprising burner and chimney. See id. at 79-80. See Tom
Arnold and Louis Riley, Contributory Infringement and Patent Misuse: The
Enactment of§ 271 and its Subsequent Amendments, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK

OFF. SOC'Y 357, 365 (1994) (discussing the view of some courts that after
Mercoid "the mere act of bringing a contributory infringement action was
patent misuse").

20011

PatentingIndustry Standards

contributory infringement challenges a defendant's supply of one
or more components that make up less then the entirety of the
claimed invention." 6 The related patent misuse concern is that
through such assertions, the patentee is attempting to expand the
scope of its statutorily-granted exclusionary right by restraining
competition in these components, which are generally nonpatented items.2 " The following history of the patent misuse
limitations or safe harbors of section 271(d) shows that they have
primarily developed as a counterweight to contributory
infringement; that development did not contemplate the current
conflict between industry standards and patent rights.
After the Supreme Court's 1944 Mercoid decisions,238 some
courts viewed the very act of bringing a lawsuit that alleged
contributory infringement as an act of patent misuse. 39
In
response to concerns that patent misuse was eradicating
contributory infringement, Congress enacted in the 1952 Patent
Act section 271(d), which specified certain exceptions or "safe
harbors" to patent misuse.2A
The statutory provision did not
purport to define patent misuse, but rather set forth three specific
acts which, if the patentee were otherwise entitled to relief for
direct or
contributory infringement, would not be considered
24
misuse. ,
Attorney (later Judge) Giles S. Rich and others successfully
lobbied for the inclusion of the section 271(d) safe harbor
provisions as a necessary counter-balance to the contributory
236. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2001) (defining contributory infringement).
237. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 197 (1980)
(noting that "an inevitable concomitant of the right to enjoin another from
contributory infringement is the capacity to suppress competition in an
unpatented article of commerce").
238. See generally Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661
(1944), and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S.
680 (1944).
239. See Arnold and Riley, supra note 235, at 365 (1994) (citing Stroco
Prods., Inc. v. Mullenbach, 67 U.S.P.Q. 168, 171 (S.D. Cal. 1944)).
240. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1)-(3).

241. The three patent misuse "safe harbors" included in the 1952 Patent Act,
for which "[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or

contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one

or more of the following," were that the patentee had:
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his

consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent;
(2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed

without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the
patent; and

(3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or
contributory infringement.
Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, §§ 1, 66 Stat. 811, codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(1)-(3) (1952).
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infringement provision that had been contemporaneously enacted
as section 271(c).
In view of the Supreme Court's Mercoid
decisions and the lower courts' reaction thereto, Rich and his
colleagues contended that having a contributory infringement
provision in the statute was meaningless without a counterpart
provision making clear that the assertion of contributory
infringement by a patent owner under limited conditions involving
a defendant's supply of a non-staple article 42 should not be
regarded as patent misuse.243
Congress ultimately agreed,
enacting sections 271(d) (1)-(3) as part of the 1952 Patent Act.2
The Supreme Court did not have occasion to scrutinize the
patent misuse safe harbors of section 271(d) until 1980.45 In
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co.,246 the Court
considered the propriety of a patent owner's refusal to license the
defendant and other producers of the non-staple but un-patented
chemical propani1247 to perform a patented process for applying
propanil to inhibit the growth of weeds in rice crops. The Court
also scrutinized the patent owner's practice of "tying" the grant to
rice farmers of implied licenses for use of the method based on the
farmers' purchase of propanil from the patentee, rather than from
its competitors who also manufactured the un-patented propanil.248
The defendant conceded that its sales of propanil with instructions
for use amounted to contributory infringement of the method
patent, but asserted the affirmative defense of patent misuse.249
The defendant argued that the patentee's acts of tying and refusal
to license went well outside the three then-existing patent misuse
safe harbors of section 271(d), and that by virtue of those acts the
patentee was excluded from the category of patentees "otherwise
entitled to relief' under the prefatory language of section 271(d).25 °
By a 5-4 vote, the Dawson majority rejected the defendant's
242. See Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 200. The Court explained that
Section 271(c) identifies the basic dividing line between contributory
infringement and patent misuse. It adopts a restrictive definition of
contributory infringement that distinguishes between staple and nonstaple
articles of commerce. It also defines the class of nonstaple items narrowly. In
essence, this provision places materials like the dry ice of the Carbice case

outside the scope of the contributory infringement doctrine. Id.
243. See generally Arnold and Riley, supra note 235, at 366-70.
244. See Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 235 (White, J., dissenting) (stating

that "the impetus for enactment of § 271 was this Court's decisions in the
Mercoid cases").
245. Id. at 215-20 (demonstrating that Court's patent infringement decisions

following passage of 1952 Act did not require it to address the patent misuse
provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)).
246. 448 U.S. 176 (1980).

247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

181-82.
183, 186.
186.
187.
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assertion of misuse, concluding that the patentee's acts were "not
dissimilar in either nature or effect from the [safe harbor] conduct
that is clearly embraced within § 271(d)."" 1 With respect to the
refusal to license, the majority provided little analysis except to
note that the patentee "does not license others to sell propanil, but
nothing on the face of the statute requires it to do so. "252 The
majority's decision ultimately focused much greater attention on
the patentee's act of tying than its refusal to license its
competitors. The tying was held acceptable because the tied
product, propanil, was a non-staple good, one that had "no use
except through practice of the patented method."2 53
In the
majority's view, "the provisions of § 271(d) effectively confer upon
the patentee, as a lawful adjunct of his patent rights, a limited
power to exclude others from competition in nonstaple goods. "2u
Congress in 1988 legislatively codified the Dawson decision by
adding new sub-sections (4) and (5) to the patent misuse safe
harbors of 35 U.S.C. § 271(d). 5
Of particular interest in the
industry standards context is sub-section (4), which provides that
when a patent owner is "otherwise entitled to relief for
infringement or contributory infringement of a patent," the
patentee shall not be deemed guilty of patent misuse by reason of
his having "refused to license or use any rights to the
patent ....
The legislative history on the enactment of subsection (4) is extremely limited and indicates only that the
provision was intended to codify existing case law."'

251. Dawson Chem. Co., 448 U.S. at 202, 223.

252. Id. (emphasis in original).

The dissent criticized this analysis as

simplistic, pointing out that:

Section 271(d) does not define conduct that constitutes patent misuse;
rather it simply outlines certain conduct that is not patent misuse.

Because the terms of the statute are terms of exception, the absence of
any express mention of a licensing requirement does not indicate that
respondent's refusal to license others is protected by § 271(d).

Id. at 234 (White, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 199.
254. Id. at 201.
255. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, P.L. 100-703, Title II, §§ 201, 102 Stat. 4676.

256. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4).
257. See 134 CONG. REC. 32295 (Oct. 20, 1988):
The underlying complaint about current law with respect to patent
misuse is that it was developed to address allegedly anticompetitive
effects of patent licensing arrangements. To address this problem the
Senate-passed bill ES. 1200] requires that the court find a violation of
the antitrust laws, after undertaking an economic analysis, before it can

find a patent holder guilty of misuse.
The proposal before the House today [H.R. 4972] does not adopt such a
sweeping and inflexible view. Instead the bill before us proceeds on the
basis of consensus about two categories of misuse that the Committee on
the Judiciary concluded should not be the subject of a rigid per se rule.
The two subject matters affected by the proposed amendment are
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Some scholars have suggested that the enactment of section
271(d)(4) as a safe harbor for refusals to license precludes the
assertion of a patent misuse defense in the standards capture
context.
I contend that the patent misuse defense should not be
so circumscribed. To the contrary, the sensitivity of the patent
"refusal to use or license" a patented invention and the tying of a
patented product to another separate product. Codification of the
"refusal to use or license" as not constituting patent misuse is consistent
with the current caselaw and makes sense as a matter of public policy.4
[Footnote 4:] See SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981); see
generally Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S.
405, 426-430 (1908).
Id. (excerpt of statement by Rep. Kastenmeier, concurring in Senate
amendment to H.R. 4972, Patent and Trademark Office Authorization).
Oddly, this legislative history does not cite the Supreme Court's decision on
refusals to license in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176
(1980), clearly the most pertinent authority, but rather relies on the Ninth
Circuit's SCM v. Xerox antitrust decision, which is not a patent misuse case.
See SCM, 645 F.2d at 1197 (holding that Xerox's acquisition of and subsequent
refusal to license a portfolio of patents directed to plain-paper copying did not
support a claim for monetary relief under either Section 1 or Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976), coupled with Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)). Moreover, SCM leaves the door open for a patent
misuse remedy based on a refusal to license; the Ninth Circuit in SCM court
expressly refused to reach the trial court's decision to "le[ave] open the
possibility of granting the plaintiff equitable relief," id., despite the denial of
any damages recovery.
Continental Paper Bag, the other authority cited in the remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier, likewise does not clearly support the § 271(d)(4) refusal to
license safe harbor. The Supreme Court in its 1908 Continental decision
rejected the petitioner's argument that a court of equity lacked jurisdiction to
restrain infringement of a patent on a machine for making paper bags, when
the patent had never been practiced because the non-manufacturing owner
refused to license competitors. Cont'l Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 423-24, 429-30.
The Court noted that the exclusion of competitors from use of a patent "may be
said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent," id.
at 429, and further pointed out that, unlike many foreign countries, the U.S.
had never (with one minor exception for aliens) imposed a working
requirement on patent owners. Id. Notably, the ContinentalCourt questioned
whether the patentee's refusal to license its paper bag-making machine was
truly "unreasonable or that the rights of the public were involved," id.; it left
open the possibility of relief for truly unreasonable refusals to license that
harmed the public's welfare. Id. at 430 (stating that "[wihether, however, as
case cannot arise where, regarding the situation of the parties in view of the
public interest, a court of equity might be justified in withholding relief by
injunction we do not decide").
258. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 25, at 1061 n.69:
One might interpret the patent misuse doctrine as a rule compelling
interoperability [of IP law and industry standards] in limited
circumstances. The problem with this approach is that Congress
appears to have foreclosed it in 1988, when it passed the Patent Misuse
Reform Act. That Act added 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4), which provides that
refusal to license a patent does not constitute patent misuse.
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misuse doctrine to public policy concerns beyond the marketplace
impact-focus of antitrust makes it perhaps the most viable tool
available to remedy abusive standards capture by patent owners.
Only a few reported appellate decisions following Dawson
have addressed section 271(d)(4) and whether an outright refusal
to license is patent misuse, and these have not concerned patents
on industry-promulgated standards. In the recent CSU v. Xerox
litigation 259 the Federal Circuit summarily rejected an accused
infringer's assertion that a patent owner's refusal to license or sell
it patented products constituted patent misuse.
CSU, an
independent service organization for photocopiers, sued Xerox for
violation of the antitrust laws based on Xerox's refusal to sell it
Xerox-patented replacement parts.
CSU also alleged patent
misuse as well as antitrust violation. 6 ° The district court granted
Xerox summary judgment, and the Federal Circuit affirmed,26'
concluding that:
[iln the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent
and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may
enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust
laws. We therefore will not inquire into his subjective motivation
for exerting his statutory rights, even though his refusal to sell or
license his patented invention may have an anticompetitive effect,
so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended
beyond the statutory patent grant. 262
We answer the threshold question of whether Xerox's refusal to sell
its patented parts exceeds the scope of the patent grant in the
negative.2 [Footnote 2: Having concluded that Xerox's actions fell
within the statutory patent grant, we need not separately consider
CSU's allegations of patent misuse and they are rejected.]
Therefore, our inquiry is at an end.... 263
Regrettably, the Federal Circuit in CSU provided no
analytical measure by which to determine the key patent misuse
inquiry of when an anticompetitive effect "illegally extend[s]
beyond the statutory patent grant."2'

The court's conclusion that

Xerox's acts did not so "extend beyond" was dispositive of both the

259. In re Ind. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.), 203
F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
260. In re Ind. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1132 (D. Kan.
1997) (addressing "the legal issue of whether Xerox's unilateral refusal to
license or sell its patented and copyrighted products may constitute a misuse
defense to an infringement claim or unlawful exclusionary conduct under the
antitrust laws").
261. CSU, 203 F.3d at 1324.
262. Id. at 1327-28.
263. Id. at 1328.
264. Id. at 1327.

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:897

antitrust 265 and patent misuse 266 defenses. The Federal Circuit
essentially treated the patent misuse claim as subsumed by the
antitrust finding. The court summarily concluded that Xerox had
not misused its patent, because it found no antitrust violation.267
This approach ignores the fundamental
policy differences between
2
patent misuse and antitrust. 6
Chairman Robert Pitofsky of the Federal Trade Commission
sharply criticized the Federal Circuit's decision in CSU v. Xerox,
asserting that the decision was "[a] striking example of an
approach that gives undue weight to intellectual property
rights."69
In Chairman Pitofsky's view, the Federal Circuit
unjustifiably:
leapt from the undeniable premise that an intellectual property
holder does not have to license anyone in the first instance to the
265. Id. at 1327-28 (citing in discussion of antitrust counterclaim the court's
earlier decision in Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of Besten's antitrust counterclaim "where
Besten's counterclaim was grounded only on GED's attempts to enforce its
right to exclude others from practicing the methods claimed in its '582
patent").
266. See Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 782 F.2d at 1001 (defining patent misuse as
acts that "impermissibly broaden[ the 'physical or temporal scope' of the
patent grant with anticompetitive effect") (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc.
v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)).
267. CSU, 203 F.3d at 1328 n.2. The Federal Circuit in CSU did cite the
patent misuse safe harbor for refusals to license under 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4),
but only in the context of discussing whether Xerox had violated the antitrust
laws. Id. at 1326. The CSU court's treatment of patent misuse as essentially
subsumed in the resolution of the defendants' antitrust allegations reflects the
overlap between the two areas of law and the analytical difficulties created
thereby. Commentators have vigorously debated whether the continued
existence of the patent misuse doctrine is justified in view of remedies
available for similar conduct under the antitrust laws. See Note, Is the Patent
Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922 (1997) (contending that
patent misuse doctrine retains vitality, at least as applied by Federal Circuit
in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); Lemley,
supra note 234, at 1628 (characterizing as "untenable" Professor Merges'
position that differences between patent misuse doctrine and antitrust laws
justify the continued existence of patent misuse doctrine) (citing Merges,
supra note 137, at 797); Merges, supra note 137, at 793 (arguing that patent
misuse doctrine facilitates patent law's goal of limiting patent claims to legal
and equitable boundaries of patent owner's invention, by punishing activities
that may not have "anticompetitive" affect in the antitrust law sense);
Calkins, supra note 215, at 187 (contending that patent misuse doctrine and
antitrust laws are grounded on different underlying policy bases, and objecting
to rejection of patent misuse defense in favor of antitrust-only framework
because "[riequiring extensive market analysis and expert testimony to prove
nothing more than a simple misuse defense will unquestionably impair the
public policy encompassed in the patent laws as pronounced by the Supreme
Court for over seventy years").
268. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
269. Pitofsky, supra note 32, at 545-46.
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unjustifiable conclusions that it can select among licensees or can
That
condition a license to achieve an anticompetitive effect ....
approach... allow [s] intellectual property holders to extend their
market power beyond the scope of the intellectual property right
itself and sacrific[es] more competition than is necessary to provide
270
appropriate incentives to innovate.
Chairman Pitofsky's comments support the position that the
section 271(d)(4) patent misuse safe harbor for refusals to license
should not be interpreted so broadly as to permit any such refusals
211
no matter what the context or how anticompetitive the impact.
Moreover, the prefatory "otherwise entitled to relief' qualifier of
section 271(d) could indicate that Congress envisioned newlyarising factual scenarios where a patentee should be excluded
from the section's protections for public policy reasons not
envisioned at the time of passage of the 1952 Patent Act. The
problem of standards capture by refusal to license a non-disclosed
patent covering standards technology presents such a newlyCourts should carefully consider whether a
arising scenario.
patentee's refusal to license a patent on standards technology that
the patentee intentionally did not disclose to the standards-setting
body extends the anti-competitive effect of the refusal beyond the
statutory patent grant and propels such acts into the realm of
actionable patent misuse.7
VI. CONCLUSION
standard,
a technology
government mandates
When
particularly a standard pertaining to public health and safety, any
entity holding patent rights in the subject matter of the standard
should be required to license all users at reasonable commercial
terms. If the patent owner fails to meet this requirement, the
government should consider the exercise of eminent domain over
the patent.
In the case of a technology standard promulgated by industry,
the key inquiry should be whether the patentee disclosed the
existence of its patent or patent application to the standards270. Id. at 546.
271. See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215
n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (disagreeing with suggestion that 1988 amendment of 35
U.S.C. § 271(d) to add sub-section (4) "may even herald the prohibition of all
antitrust claims... premised on a refusal to license a patent," (quoting Data
Gen. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994),
citing Calkins, supra note 215, at 192-97), because in Ninth Circuit's view "the
amended statutory language does not compel this result" and "§ 271(d)(4)
merely codified existing law.")
272. Alternatively, Congress could amend the § 271(d) patent misuse
exceptions to make clear that those protections would not extend so far as to
shield patent misuse based on standards capture that involves the intentional
non-disclosure of patent rights to a standards-setting body.

946
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setting body while that body had an opportunity to select an
alternate, non-proprietary standard. Where the patentee failed to
disclose a patent but that failure was not intentional, and the
standard ultimately adopted by industry requires use of the
subject matter of the patent, compulsory licensing at reasonable
commercial terms should be imposed if the patent owner refuses to
license all users of the standard. If the patentee's non-disclosure
of its intellectual property rights to the standards-setting body
was intentional, however, courts should refuse to enforce the
patent altogether under the patent misuse doctrine, thus
depriving the patentee of any remedy, injunctive or monetary, for
use of the patented invention.

